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Chapter 1
Introduction
Research in behavioral economics has made enormous progress in integrating in-
sights from psychology and traditional models of economic decision-making. The
concept of man in standard theory relies on the idea that each individual has stable
preferences and – based on these preferences – maximizes the expected value of a
well-deﬁned utility function. However, a large number of experimental and empi-
rical studies have provided evidence that this concept is in many cases not a good
approximation of real behavior. In a survey article, DellaVigna (2009) identiﬁes
three ﬁelds of “behavioral anomalies”.1 First, utility may be inﬂuenced by other
factors than a person’s absolute payoﬀ (non-standard preferences). Second, beliefs,
i.e. subjective expectations of the probabilities of certain events, may be biased in
a systematic way (non-standard beliefs). Finally, economic decision-makers may be
guided by heuristics or be inﬂuenced heavily by framing or emotions (non-standard
decision-making).
This thesis focuses on the application of the ﬁrst group of behavioral phenomena
– non-standard preferences – to the context of agency problems. More precisely, we
investigate possible impacts of non-standard preferences on trust, eﬃciency and eco-
nomic development (chapter 2), analyze their eﬀects on the functioning of incentives
in organizations (chapters 3 and 4) and show how they might inﬂuence the success
of contract schemes in microﬁnance credit programs (chapter 5).
First, social preferences play a central role for the presented research studies.
Theories of social preferences propose that subjects do not only care about their
1For other surveys of research in behavioral economics see Earl (1990), Rabin (1998), Kahneman
(2003) and Camerer and Loewenstein (2004).
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own material payoﬀs, but also about the payoﬀs of others. In the ‘Handbook of the
Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism’, Fehr and Schmidt (2006) distin-
guish between three types of social preference theories. Besides models of altruism
(Levine, 1998) and envy (Bolton, 1991), distributive preferences have been forma-
lized in the models of inequality aversion by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr
and Schmidt (1999). Here, utility depends not only on absolute payoﬀs but also on a
subject’s relative payoﬀ in a given reference group.2 Preferences for relative payoﬀs
are particular important for our analysis of the impact of economic inequality on
trust and trustworthiness and for the incentive eﬀects of compensation schemes. In
these contexts, preferences for social status, i.e. the notion that agents are aﬀected
by their relative rank in a given population, are also highly relevant (see Frank,
1984a,b).
Second, a group of theories postulates that subjects focus on the perceived in-
tentions behind economic actions. Concerns for intentions have been modeled by
theories of reciprocity (see Rabin, 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004, and
Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). If an action by another person is perceived as kind,
a person will be more willing to choose a kind action as well, whereas any unkind
action will provoke the desire to get even.
In repeated games, reciprocity is reﬂected also in the pattern of conditional co-
operation. There is strong evidence that persons are more willing to contribute in
a social dilemma if they believe that others will contribute as well.3 Conditional
cooperation will play an important role for our studies addressing the evolution of
behavior, i.e. the dynamics of trust and trustworthiness (chapter 2) and cooperation
within groups of borrowers who are jointly responsible for loan repayments (chapter
5).
Finally, the focus will be on loss aversion as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) in one chapter of this thesis (see also Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, and
Kahneman et al., 1991). Loss aversion describes the phenomenon that subjects
evaluate economic outcomes not in absolute terms but rather in terms of gains and
losses from a given reference point. Furthermore, utility functions capturing loss
aversion have a kinked form around the reference point which implies that losses
relative to the reference point decrease utility stronger than same-sized gains increase
2There are also models that additionally incorporate preferences for social eﬃciency, see, for
example, Charness and Rabin (2002).
3For a survey of related ﬁndings from laboratory and ﬁeld experiments see Gächter (2006).
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it. In our empirical analysis of a bonus system implemented in a multinational
company (chapter 3), loss aversion among managers will have strong implications
for the incentive and satisfaction eﬀects created by the system.
The four research projects presented in this thesis follow an empirical approach
and explore the relevance of the described behavioral regularities for the functioning
of incomplete contracts. Our starting point is that the existence of non-standard
preferences might crucially alter economic incentives in the respective environments
and create ineﬃciencies. Thus, the ﬁrst step is to identify where and under which
circumstances such ineﬃciencies might occur. Second, the results of the studies are
used to infer practical implications for the design of economic institutions in the
ﬁelds of personnel and ﬁnancial economics. In the following, a brief overview is
given on the research questions and central results of the studies.
The second chapter “An Experiment on Inequality and Trust” (based on Greiner
et al., 2007) explores behavioral impacts of inequality for economic development.
The central research question is what the eﬀects for the eﬃciency of transactions
in a society are if agents care about relative positions. On a societal level, the
existence of trust makes economic agents more willing to engage in interactions
involving the risk of being deceived which in turn enhances eﬃciency and economic
growth. However, data from survey studies show that a too strong dispersion of
wealth is detrimental for the process of economic development, because higher social
distance lowers peoples’ willingness to trust (Alesina and Ferrara, 2002; Gustavsson
and Jordahl, 2008). Our experiment complements this literature and investigates
the dynamic interplay of trust, eﬃciency and distribution in a controlled laboratory
setting.
Our working-horse is a growth game, a modiﬁed dynamic version of the trust
game introduced by Berg et al. (1995). In our dynamic game, we explore behavioral
consequences of economic inequality on trust and trustworthiness by varying initial
endowments of the agents and allowing them to accumulate wealth from trusting
transactions over the rounds. We ﬁnd that in experimental economies starting with
equally distributed endowments, trust is relatively prevalent at the beginning but
decreases over time. When endowments are unequal, trust is initially lower yet
remains relatively stable. Furthermore, there is no evidence of deliberate redistribu-
tion from rich to poor agents in the treatment with heterogeneous endowments that
would be in line with straightforward concerns for equality. However, trust in the
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economies starting with equal endowments is conditioned on the investor’s and the
trustee’s wealth. This diﬀerence in behavior is partly due to the fact that relative
wealth has a diﬀerent information value and source between the treatments.
Our ﬁndings are in line with related studies on the eﬀect of the source of inequality
on cooperation in dilemma games (see, for example Haile et al., 2008) and studies
about the eﬀect of procedural fairness for the acceptance of unfavorable outcomes
(see Bolton et al., 2005). Thus, while our laboratory experiment captures only few of
the characteristics of economic inequality in the ﬁeld, it provides an indication that
the process through which inequality emerges can inﬂuence the relation between
income dispersion and development.
The following two chapters of this thesis are concerned with principal-agent re-
lationships in working environments. Moral hazard problems arise when working
output is insecure and the eﬀort of an employee cannot be directly observed. The
reason is that employer and employee have diﬀerent objectives. Whereas the goal
of the employer is to induce high eﬀort exertion, because this implies higher success
probabilities and higher expected proﬁts, a worker has the incentive to choose the
lowest possible eﬀort level. In this situation the employer can implement high eﬀorts
through monetary rewards such as piece-rates and bonuses that are related to the
observable output of a worker.4 However, if workers are not only concerned about
their own wages, monetary incentives may not have the desired impact.
If workers have concerns for relative wages, a central question for the design of
compensation schemes is how to diﬀerentiate in payments. Frank (1984a,b) suggests
that preferences for relative ranks lead to wage compression in ﬁrms. In his model,
a worker’s productivity is exogenous per assumption. However, concerns for rela-
tive positions might also inﬂuence worker productivity endogenously through eﬀort
choices. Yet the sign of this relationship is not clear per se. On the one hand,
low relative wages might increase eﬀorts in some cases to overcome the dispersion in
income. On the other hand, low relative pay might crowd out a worker’s motivation.
Anecdotal evidence for the latter eﬀect is provided by Bewley (1999), who sur-
veyed more than 300 US companies and concluded that “within a company, pay
inequity oﬀends (indeed, sometimes outrages) employees and destroys trust”. With
this result as the starting point, we investigate in two studies if and how reference-
4For general introductions into the economic modeling of moral hazard problems see, for exam-
ple, the textbooks by Laﬀont and Martimort (2002) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
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dependent preferences inﬂuence the functionality of incentives in working relations.
The third chapter entitled “Reference Points, Job Satisfaction and Performance”
(based on Ockenfels et al., 2009) applies the phenomenon of relative comparisons and
loss aversion to the context of bonus schemes. We analyze the impact of reference
points both on job satisfaction and performance with the example of a bonus system
for the executives of a world-wide operating company.
A connection of survey, compensation and performance data on the individual
level enables us to assess direct implications of incentive devices. In particular, the
implemented system has the advantage that it provides a clear reference point for
the managers – their yearly bonus budgets – to evaluate their bonus payments. This
reference point has two important features: ﬁrst, it is a personal reference point that
determines the individual potential bonus payment in a given year. Second, it is also
a social reference point, because it reveals information about the relative standing
of a particular person with respect to her peer managers.
We ﬁnd – in line with loss aversion and inequality aversion – that negative de-
viations from reference points have signiﬁcant detrimental eﬀects on reported job
satisfaction while there is no signiﬁcant impact of positive deviations. Furthermore,
lack of transparency mitigates the importance of reference points, and spot bonuses
have a stronger eﬀect on satisfaction than regular bonus payments even though
their economic relevance is much smaller. Furthermore, we ﬁnd a detrimental eﬀect
of reference point violations on performance. The more managers a supervisor re-
duces below their personal budgets, the lower is her estimated performance in the
subsequent year.
These ﬁndings have important implications for the design of incentive schemes
in business practice. Although regular bonuses account for substantial shares of the
managers’ yearly incomes, they are not related to job satisfaction in our sample.
Instead, managers evaluate bonus payments based on their relative standings where
the reference point is salient. Hence, due to the asymmetric eﬀect of deviations
from the reference point, the system handling creates ineﬃciencies where it fosters
its emergence.
The fourth chapter “Social Comparisons in a Real-Eﬀort Experiment” (based on
Greiner et al., 2009) picks up the idea that wage transparency and relative compa-
risons between workers may aﬀect incentives. In a controlled laboratory setting, we
let participants perform simple working tasks to examine the net eﬀects of discrimi-
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natory wage increases and decreases. Our experimental data provides no evidence
for a direct impact of wage changes on performance. However, in a treatment with
piece-rates, we ﬁnd an inﬂuence of social comparisons on eﬀort exertion. Information
about peer wages triggers performance diﬀerences between high-wage and low-wage
subjects that are absent when participants do not know about the wage diﬀerence.
This eﬀect is mainly driven by negative responses to wage cuts. In a ﬁxed wage
environment under public wage information, performance diﬀerences between high-
and low-paid workers are largely mitigated.
Similar to the study in chapter 3, this experiment provides evidence that trans-
parency of wages might be counterproductive from a company’s perspective. Rela-
tive comparisons lead to ineﬃciencies, because subjects under piece-rates increase
working quantity to catch up with their highly paid co-workers (a pattern also in
line with inequality aversion) which comes at the cost of lower quality. Contrary,
positive output eﬀects as a reaction to wage increases are not strong enough to yield
a positive net eﬀect for the employer.
Chapter 5 “The Dynamics of Cooperation in a Microﬁnance Game” (based on
Werner, 2009) is related to the design of credit contracts in microﬁnance lending.
The latter term subsumes alternative ﬁnancial services to provide poor population
groups the access to credit markets. Under the widely-used contract scheme of group
or joint liability lending, several borrowers form groups that are jointly responsible
for the repayment of the entire credit sum. While group lending provides a “social”
collateral against involuntary default and mitigates agency problems between banks
and borrowers, it has the drawback that moral hazard problems are potentially
created within the group. As the responsibility for repayment is borne by others,
borrowers have incentives to free-ride by shifting investment risks to group members.
Given that in practice borrower groups typically receive more than a single loan,
the dynamics of behavior are particularly important and are therefore in the focus of
our study. Moreover, we analyze whether diﬀerent mechanisms are suited to main-
tain cooperation under joint liability after some participants have been converted
to individual credit contracts. In our experiment, subjects decide about the eﬀort
invested into risky projects. Under group responsibility, the highest feasible eﬀort
maximizes joint payoﬀs while minimum eﬀort is the individually optimal choice.
However, preferences for equal outcomes as well as for reciprocity might motivate
positive eﬀort levels.
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Indeed, despite the absence of direct sanctioning mechanisms, average eﬀort re-
mains high until the end of the game. Nevertheless, moral hazard is still persistent
within groups, as subjects converted into individual liability increase their eﬀort sig-
niﬁcantly. Moreover, we ﬁnd a path dependency of behavior, as the willingness to
exert eﬀort declines with lower partner eﬀorts and also with the frequency of partner
repayments. The correlation of eﬀort choices with partner eﬀort is in line with the
ﬁndings of conditional cooperation in dilemma games (see, for example, the study
by Fischbacher and Gächter, forthcoming). With respect to conversion mechanisms,
we ﬁnd that after self-selection of participants into contract schemes, average eﬀort
levels persist on a high level under group lending. Contrary, when groups are con-
verted on the basis of repayment performance, average eﬀort levels among the re-
maining borrower groups tend to be lower than in the reference treatment.
To sum up, the experiment suggests that the functioning of group lending schemes
might indeed be inﬂuenced by the dynamic interaction between group members.
Hence, increased monitoring from outside might become necessary to mitigate
within-group moral hazard.
In the following, all studies are presented in detail. The ﬁnal chapter reviews
their main results and brieﬂy discusses their implications and remaining questions
for further research.
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Chapter 2
An Experiment on Inequality and
Trust
2.1 Introduction
The degree of trust in an economy may positively inﬂuence economic growth and
the distribution of wealth. Yet trust is diﬃcult to identify and measure in the ﬁeld,
both on the microeconomic and the macroeconomic level. Survey data frequently
discover individual attitudes towards trust, but cannot easily identify to what extent
such self-reported attitudes reﬂect actual economic behavior, and how trust evolves
in a dynamic environment. Furthermore, as has been argued by Durlauf (2002),
the causal relationship between trust and economic variables is often ambiguous.
He thus advocates the use of laboratory studies. In this paper we follow Durlauf’s
advice and complement the empirical and survey literature with laboratory experi-
ments that systematically investigate the dynamic interplay of trust, eﬃciency and
distribution.
The working horse of our experiment is a growth game, which embeds a variant
of the trust game introduced by Berg et al. (1995) into a dynamic context. In
this game, an investor can send an amount of money to an anonymous trustee.
Before received by the trustee, the amount sent is multiplied by a factor greater
than one, and thus yields eﬃciency gains. Subsequently, the trustee decides on how
much of the amount received she wishes to send back to the investor. The amount
sent can be interpreted as a measure of trust, while the amount returned measures
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the degree of trustworthiness.1 However, in our game, income from interactions is
cumulated over time. Participants start with either an unequal or equal distribution
of initial endowments within a group. In each of several rounds they play the
trust game with a randomly matched anonymous partner. Before making decisions,
both transaction partners are informed about the current wealth of their opponent.
Round payoﬀs are added to endowments, and therefore determine the amount that
can be exchanged in future rounds. That is, investments and repayments (i.e. trust
and trustworthiness) jointly aﬀect the current and potential future growth rates of
the ‘laboratory economy’, as well as the evolution of economic inequality.2
We observe that initial investment levels are lower in the treatment starting
with unequal endowments (IEQ) compared to the treatment with equal endow-
ments (EQ). However, in IEQ trust depends less on wealth comparisons. Part of
the reason is that the source of inequality plays a role in what can be inferred from
wealth comparisons: while in EQ all wealth diﬀerences must be due to diﬀerences
in trust and trustworthiness across subjects, in IEQ diﬀerences in behavior are con-
cealed by diﬀerences in the initial wealth allocation. As a result, trust is triggered
diﬀerently across treatments. Investment rates decrease steadily and strongly over
time in EQ, yet they remain rather stable in IEQ. The wealth distributions in equal
and unequal economies converge to each other.
In Section 2.2 we review the literature related to our experiment. Section 2.3
explains the details of our experimental design and procedures, and sketches hy-
potheses based on previous empirical results and economic models. Our experimen-
tal data and statistical analysis are presented in Section 2.4. We discuss our results
and conclude in Section 2.5.
1The original game by Berg et al. (1995) is sometimes called ‘investment game’, and the amount
sent is interpreted as a measure for investment in risky projects. In our setting, that interpretation
ﬁts as well.
2E.g., if all investments yield the same positive rate of return, the dynamic game allows initially
rich subjects to increase their endowments much more than initially poor subjects.
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2.2 Related Literature
There is a large body of empirical and theoretical economic literature on the rela-
tionship between inequality within a country and its level of growth and prosperity.
The evidence is, however, not unambiguous.3 Some authors have argued that trust
is the key for understanding this relationship: Inequality decreases the level of trust
and trustworthiness in an economy, which in turn negatively aﬀects growth.4 Em-
pirical evidence is provided by Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001),
who found that countries with higher income dispersion (measured by the Gini co-
eﬃcient for income) exhibit signiﬁcantly lower values for a trust measure derived
from the World Values Survey (WVS).5 Similarly, Alesina and Ferrara (2002) found
a negative connection between social distance and trusting behavior in a study re-
stricted to the United States. Gustavsson and Jordahl (2008) combine Swedish
individual panel data with aggregate data on inequality and ﬁnd that stronger dis-
parities among people in the bottom half of the income distribution have a detri-
mental eﬀect on trust. Furthermore, a number of empirical studies established a
positive impact of generalized trust on economic development (Knack and Keefer,
1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; La Porta et al., 1997).
3The academic discussion started in the 1950s with the Kuznets-Curve (Kuznets, 1955), which
proposed a relation between inequality and economic development in the form of an inverted U.
Most of the more recent theoretical literature assumes a negative relationship, including the mod-
els of Galor and Zeira (1993) and Persson and Tabellini (1994). Bénabou (1996), Ros (2000) and
Glaeser (2005) survey the diﬀering strains of literature. The majority of early empirical studies of
the relationship of inequality and trust ﬁnd a negative link between income disparity and growth
(see Bénabou, 1996). However, some of the more recent studies, employing panel data and ad-
vanced econometrics, yield either no eﬀect (e.g. Barro, 2000) or even a positive relationship (e.g.
Forbes, 2000; Castelló-Climent, 2004). Banerjee and Duﬂo (2003) argue that non-linearity of the
relationship might be a reason for the ambiguous results. They ﬁnd that any change in inequality –
in each direction – aﬀects growth detrimentally. In their meta-analysis of empirical studies, De Do-
minicis et al. (2008) show that estimation techniques, included independents, development status
of countries, and length of considered growth period have a signiﬁcant impact on the estimated
size and direction of the eﬀect of inequality on growth.
4See Jordahl (2008) for an overview of diﬀerent mechanisms explaining the negative impact of
inequality on generalized trust. Other authors see other forms of human capital, such as education
(e.g. Castelló-Climent, 2004), or social preferences as possible links. Corneo and Grüner (2000)
and Corneo and Jeanne (2001) discuss concerns for social status, as these might discourage both
poor and rich subjects to accumulate income in an unequal society and lower the political will for
redistribution.
5The World Values Survey consists of repeated interview studies with representative population
samples on the changes in moral values and beliefs, conducted in 80 countries all over the world
since 1981. One question is: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted
or that you can‘t be too careful in dealing with people?”. The percentage of positive responses is
used as a measure of generalized trust in a country.
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Durlauf (2002), however, notes that there are various problems of causality and
identiﬁcation in many empirical studies on the relationship between social capital,
trust and economic indices. He thus proposes the use of laboratory experiments to
investigate the causal structure between these measures. Results from such economic
experiments allow to build models of individual behavior to explain the relationship
between social capital and economic measures on the aggregate (see, for example,
the model by Glaeser et al., 2002).
There is experimental evidence on the relationship between cooperation and in-
equality in public goods games, which share a couple of features with the trust game
studied here. This evidence is, however, mixed. In a survey on repeated public goods
games with complete information, Ledyard (1995) comes to the conclusion that eco-
nomic heterogeneity among subjects generally lowers cooperation levels. Chan et al.
(1996) ﬁnd that poor subjects contribute more to a public good than rich subjects.
Buckley and Croson (2006) conduct a linear public good game with heterogenous
endowments of the subjects. In their study, rich and poor subjects contribute on
average the same absolute amount to a public good. Thus, as poor subjects con-
tribute a higher share of their respective endowments, economic inequality increases
within the experimental groups.
Other studies are devoted to the relationship between social distance (measured
on various scales) and investment behavior in the trust game introduced by Berg
et al. (1995). Glaeser et al. (2000) combine questionnaires on social backgrounds
and trust attitudes with an experimental trust game. In their experiment, subjects
interacting face-to-face with a partner of a diﬀerent race or nationality exhibit a
lower level of trustworthiness. In addition, a higher social status of the sender seems
to be positively related to the earnings of a trusting decision. Hence, the results
of this study indicate detrimental eﬀects of social distance. However, their survey
measures of generalized trust are not correlated with actual trusting behavior.
Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) ﬁnd signiﬁcantly diﬀerent degrees of trust towards
diﬀerent ethnical groups in the Israeli-Jewish society, although these groups do not
diﬀer concerning their trustworthiness. In a recent study, Haile et al. (2006) conduct
a trust game experiment with South-African students. They ﬁnd negative eﬀects of
socio-economic diﬀerences, as low-income subjects trust less when confronted with
a high-income transaction partner from another ethnic group.
To our knowledge, there are only two experiments which speciﬁcally study the role
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of payoﬀ inequality in the trust game. Contrary to the studies discussed above, social
distance is induced by the experimental design. Brülhart and Usunier (2007) vary
endowments of the trustees, which however does not aﬀect trust. Anderson et al.
(2006) employ an equal as well as a symmetric and a skewed unequal distribution
of show-up fees in a trust game. The distribution of show-ups is either private or
public information. The authors observe only small and non-systematic eﬀects of
unequal endowments on trusting behavior.
2.3 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
In our study, we focus on the dynamic interaction of trust, trustworthiness and
inequality. Therefore, we develop a growth game which embeds the essentials of
trust game introduced by Berg et al. (1995) but puts them into a dynamic growth
and distribution context. The growth game is played over 20 rounds. In each round,
two randomly and anonymously matched subjects play a variant of the trust game.
One of the subjects is randomly assigned the role of the investor, the other the role of
a trustee. Before decisions are made, each subject is informed about his own and the
opponent’s wealth in the current round. Wealth is deﬁned as the initial endowment
plus any payoﬀs that have been accumulated in earlier rounds. A player’s wealth
limits the amount that he can invest or return in the current round of the growth
game in the following way. The investor decides on an amount S, which is not
allowed to exceed his current wealth, to be sent to the trustee. Any amount sent
is multiplied by the factor 1.2, i.e. the trustee receives 1:2S. Next, the trustee can
decide on the amount R to be sent back to the investor. The minimum amount to be
returned is 0:9S, or 90% of the amount sent.6 The upper limit is given by the sum
of the current wealth of the trustee plus the received amount. Because payoﬀs are
accumulated over the course of the repeated trust game, our laboratory economies
could maximally grow by an expected factor of 6.7.7
As our main experimental parameter, we varied the distribution of the initial
endowments across our two treatments. In the equality condition (EQ), all subjects
6These rules make the one-round interaction in our game equivalent to the original trust game
interaction with a sent amount multiplier of three, with the exception that the amount that can be
sent is restricted to 10% of the investor’s wealth. Without such restrictions, the experiment could
have gone beyond the scope of any reasonable ﬁnancial budget.
7As in each round only half of the subjects in the economy are randomly assigned to the role of
the investor, the expected maximum growth rate over 20 rounds with full investments corresponds
to 1:120.
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were endowed with an amount of 500 ET (Experiment Talers) before the ﬁrst round.
In the inequality treatment (IEQ), half of the subjects in each matching group re-
ceived 200 ET, and the other half received 800 ET. In order to investigate experience
eﬀects and to test robustness of behavior, we played two runs of 20 rounds; that
is, after the ﬁrst 20 rounds of the experiment we restarted the game for another
20 rounds. Subjects were told before the session that the experiment consisted of
several runs, one of which would be randomly selected for payoﬀ.
The experimental sessions took place in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic
Research. We conducted four sessions, two for each of our treatments. Subjects
were recruited using the Online Recruitment System by Greiner (2004). Altogether
128 student subjects participated. Each session consisted of 32 participants. Ran-
dom matching per round was restricted to groups of 8 participants.8 It was pub-
licly known that two subjects would never interact with each other in consecutive
rounds. Due to this procedure, we obtained observations on 8 statistically indepen-
dent ‘economies’ for each treatment. Overall, we collected 2,560 choices for each
player role.
The experiment was computerized using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
After subjects arrived and were randomly assigned to a cubicle, instructions were
distributed.9 Questions were answered privately. At the end of the experiment
subjects ﬁlled in a post-experimental questionnaire asking for demographical data
and containing open questions for motivations of subjects’ decisions. Finally, either
run 1 or run 2 was selected for payoﬀ by publicly rolling a die. Participants were
paid out privately and left the laboratory. The exchange rate was ﬁxed at 150 ET =
1 Euro. The average payoﬀ was 12.25 Euros (including a show-up fee of 2.50 Euros)
with a standard deviation of 5.09 Euros. Each session lasted approximately one and
a half hours.
In the rest of this chapter, we will motivate a number of competing hypotheses
for the dynamic interplay of inequality and trust based on (simpliﬁed) theoretical
reasoning and empirical ﬁndings. These hypotheses help organizing our analyzes
and ﬁndings. At the same time, however, we wish to caution that our experiment is
mainly designed to complement the empirical studies, and not as a test of any par-
ticular theory - if only because there is no theory yet that addresses the potentially
8Subjects were not informed that the matching procedure was restricted in such a way, conveying
the impression that being matched with the same opponent more than once is very unlikely.
9Instructions are included in section 2.6.
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complex dynamics we are interested in.
The standard game theoretic prediction is trivial. Because of the ﬁniteness of the
growth game, there is no trust and no trustworthiness among selﬁsh and rational
players if selﬁshness and rationality are common knowledge. However, starting with
Berg et al. (1995), numerous experiments have shown that subjects are willing to
invest and return non-trivial amounts of money in the trust game. For a survey of
the trust game literature see, for example, Camerer (2003).
While the experimental one-shot version of the trust game is by now well-analyzed
and -understood, the dynamic interplay of inequality and trust in the context of our
growth game is not easily predicted. However, observe that both of our treatments
start with identical average endowments. If inequality does not aﬀect subjects’
willingness to send and return money, relative to their endowments, the two treat-
ments may be expected to yield equivalent results with respect to growth rates.10
On the other hand, the empirical and experimental literature on social and economic
heterogeneity cited in Section 2.2 suggests that we may observe a negative impact
of inequality on trust in our setting. Dispersion of wealth could increase social
distance between economic agents and, as a result, trust and trustworthiness may
decrease. To the extent our experiment captures some of the underlying mechanisms
assumed in this literature, we should expect less growth and lower eﬃciency in the
IEQ treatment.
Finally, we note that theories of social preferences can organize some of the devia-
tions from standard equilibrium behavior observed in the trust game. For instance,
inequity aversion models (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) can
in principle explain both trust and trustworthiness in the trust game.11 However,
these models do not yield unambiguous comparative static predictions across the
two treatments of our growth game. To see why, observe for instance that a rather
fair-minded investor who is matched with a relatively poor trustee may send money
to equalize payoﬀs, while a rather selﬁsh investor may not send money because
he cannot expect to get anything back from a relatively poor opponent. Thus, the
10In the beginning of the ﬁrst round, the average endowment of investors in treatment EQ is
equal to 500, as it is in treatment IEQ. Thus, if the same share is sent and returned, expected
overall invested amounts are the same, as well as the amounts returned. Therefore, the expected
endowments of investors in round 2 are the same in both treatments. The same reasoning applies
to all consecutive rounds of the game.
11See Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), page 187, for a detailed description of the mechanics of the
fairness models in the context of the trust game by Berg et al. (1995).
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predictions of inequity aversion models will depend on the distribution of preferences.
It appears, though, that ‘myopic’, straightforward concerns for equal payoﬀs lead
to more trust and trustworthiness in IEQ in the following sense: Even when an
inequality averse subject assumes that everybody else behaves in a completely selﬁsh
manner, he still has reason to trust and to be trustworthy towards relatively poor
opponents in the inequality treatment (where, in the beginning of round 1, the payoﬀ
distribution is unfair), but no such incentive exists in the equality treatment (where
the payoﬀ distribution is fair if everybody behaves selﬁshly).
2.4 Experimental Results
2.4.1 Aggregate Data
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 depict the evolution of average send and return rates over time.
We deﬁne the ‘send rate’ in a particular round as the share of the investor’s wealth
in this round that she invests in the transaction. The ‘return rate’ is deﬁned as
the amount returned minus the mandatory 90% (R  0:9S), divided by the amount
received minus the mandatory 90% (1:2S 0:9S). For example, a return rate of 1=3
implies that the trustee returns exactly the amount invested by the investor. (The
dashed horizontal line in Figure 2.2 indicates this ‘break-even line’.) For ﬁgures
and non-parametrical tests the send rate averages are calculated by adding up all
amounts sent in a matching group, and dividing the sum by the total wealth of the
senders.12
Figure 2.1 shows that the dynamics of trust diﬀer markedly between the treat-
ments. In the ﬁrst round of the games, the equal distribution of wealth leads to
higher trust levels (54% more, to be exact) than the unequal distribution. This ob-
servation is in line with previous empirical and theoretical work suggesting that in-
equality hampers eﬃciency. However, applying two-sided Mann-Whitney-U (MWU)
tests to (statistically independent) individual send rates and to respective matching
group data in round 1 shows that the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant (p = :136 and
p = :130, respectively).13
12This procedure seems appropriate since here our focus is on aggregate behavior and indepen-
dent observations. However, our conclusions from statistical tests would not be diﬀerent if we had
used individual averages.
13The reason is the heterogeneity of subjects in treatment IEQ. More speciﬁcally, poor IEQ
subjects send less in absolute terms than EQ subjects (p < :01), but not in relative terms, while
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Figure 2.1
Average Send Rates over Rounds
Send rates in treatment EQ strongly and steadily decrease over time from 68% in
round 1 to 20% in round 20 in run 1, and from 77% to 15% in run 2, while send rates
in IEQ increase slightly in run 1 and decrease slightly in run 2. Correspondingly,
in EQ average send rates of the matching groups are signiﬁcantly and negatively
correlated to the number of rounds (Pearson-R=-.586, p < :001 and Pearson-R=
-.394, p < :001 for run 1 and 2, respectively) while this is not (strongly) so in
IEQ (Pearson-R=.061, p = :442 and Pearson-R=-.154, p = :051 for run 1 and 2,
respectively).14
As shown in Figure 2.2, average return rates are about the break-even level that
makes an investment proﬁtable, with probably a small advantage for IEQ in run 1.
In fact, diﬀerences in return rates across treatments and over time are much less
pronounced than diﬀerences in send rates. In the aggregate data, we ﬁnd that, in
the ﬁrst run, average return rates are 24% lower in treatment EQ than in treatment
IEQ15 - yet the eﬀect disappears in run 2.
rich subjects send less in relative terms (p < :05), but not in absolute terms. However, our analysis
of individual behavior in the next subsection, where we control for these wealth eﬀects, conﬁrms
the observation that initial inequality hampers eﬃciency on any standard signiﬁcance level.
14Applying two-sided Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Signed Ranks (WMPSR) tests, a similar conclu-
sion is reached when comparing matching group averages in the ﬁrst and the second half of each
run.
15A two-sided MWU test applied to independent matching group averages indicates signiﬁcance
with p = :021.
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Figure 2.2
Average Return Rates over Rounds
More investment directly expands overall wealth, because the latter is a cumu-
lative measure of the former. So, the diﬀerent dynamics in trust across laboratory
economies are reﬂected in diﬀerent growth rates of overall wealth. Figure 2.3 de-
picts average economy wealth over time. There are substantial eﬃciency gains in
both treatments and runs, with total average wealth more than doubling in all
runs of both treatments. Initially, wealth in treatment IEQ lags behind the one
in treatment EQ. However, as average send rates remain on a relatively high level
in treatment IEQ and signiﬁcantly decrease in treatment EQ, the lag is eventually
counterbalanced and reversed in the last few rounds.16 In run 2 we do not observe
large initial diﬀerences, and after the ﬁrst few rounds treatment EQ lags behind in-
delibly. Accumulated wealth in IEQ ﬁnally accounts for more than 300 % of initial
endowments.
Not only eﬃciency gains but also the distributions of wealth in our laboratory
economies evolve endogenously through sending and returning decisions. We use
Gini coeﬃcients to analyze the dispersion of individual wealth levels.17 Figure 2.4
16Statistically, the wealth of IEQ economies in rounds 1 to 5 is weakly signiﬁcantly lower than
in EQ (p=.060, two-sided MWU test). Final wealth levels are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each
other.
17The Gini coeﬃcient as a measure for disparity takes the value of zero if the income is equally
distributed among the subjects and (n   1)=n if all wealth is concentrated on only one subject.
Here, the maximum value of the Gini coeﬃcient is 7/8, as the number of subjects per experimental
matching group is n = 8).
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Figure 2.3
Average Total Economy Wealth over Rounds, in ET
shows average matching group Gini coeﬃcients in treatments EQ and IEQ (solid
lines). We observe that Gini coeﬃcients strongly and signiﬁcantly decrease (increase)
in treatment IEQ (EQ).18 Furthermore, the values for the Gini coeﬃcients tend to
converge to each other towards the end of a run. In the last round of a run, IEQ
and EQ Ginis are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (MWU, p = :505 and p = :105 for run
1 and 2, respectively).
Redistribution in our setting might have two diﬀerent sources: on the one hand,
it could be the result of random, homogenous interaction, in the sense that rates
are not conditioned on individual wealth states or wealth comparisons. Because,
for a given rate, richer subjects send more in absolute terms than poorer subjects,
unconditional behavior moves the economy towards more equality when starting
with unequal endowments. On the other hand, redistribution could be the result
of send and return rates which systematically depend on own and probably others’
wealth in the current state. Depending on the nature of conditional behavior (which
will be analyzed in subsection 2.4.2) and the heterogeneity of the behavioral patterns,
the resulting system behavior may increase or decrease equality relative to what can
be expected from unconditional homogenous interaction.
In order to isolate the eﬀects of these two mechanisms, we simulate Gini coef-
18Two-sided WMPSR tests applied to matching group averages for rounds 1-10 and rounds 11-20
of each run yield p = :008 for treatment IEQ (both runs) and p = :055 and p = :008 for treatment
EQ (run 1 and run 2, respectively).
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Figure 2.4
Observed and Simulated Gini Coefficients over Rounds
ﬁcients for unconditional, homogenous behavior. More speciﬁcally, simulations are
based on the same role and group matchings as implemented in our experiment.
Additionally, we assume that in every round all participants in a matching group
behave identical – like the group average.19 If actual behavior is unconditional with
respect to wealth levels and diﬀerences, simulations and actual behavior cannot
diﬀer.
The average simulated Gini coeﬃcients (see the dashed lines in Figure 2.4) follow
the same general pattern as the observed ones. In treatment IEQ, simulated and
observed Gini curves are nearly the same (run 1) or diﬀer only slightly (run 2).
WMPSR tests yield no signiﬁcance comparing average observed and simulated Ginis
for whole runs or 10-round intervals. In treatment EQ, observed Gini values are
constantly higher than the simulated values, and the diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at
p < :016 with two-sided WMPSR tests applied to whole runs or 10-round intervals.
Thus, on the aggregate level, we ﬁnd little evidence for systematic and deliberate
redistributive behavior from rich to poor in treatment IEQ. Contrary, inequality
rises faster than expected in treatment EQ, suggesting that there are indeed hete-
rogeneous behavioral patterns that systematically aﬀect wealth distribution – as
studied in the next subsection.
19This procedure yields the same economy growth rates in the simulation as in the experiment.
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2.4.2 Individual Decisions
We regressed the individual send and return rates on a number of independent
variables in order to investigate the determinants of individual behavior.20 Besides
the Round number (1-20), and two dummies for Treatment (0 for EQ, 1 for IEQ)
and Run (0 for 1st, 1 for 2nd run), we include the relative wealth standing of
the sender (WSDR) and the responder (WRSPR) prior to the current transaction.
Both variables are derived by dividing the respective decision maker’s wealth by the
average wealth in her economy (matching group). For the regression of the return
rate we also include the send rate of the counterpart. To account for group-speciﬁc
as well as for subject-individual characteristics, we use Mixed Eﬀects models. Due to
the rather complex dynamic nature of our game, we cannot exclude any interaction
eﬀects between the independent variables, which poses a model selection problem
that we addressed in the following way: in our main regressions, we start with
the full factorial set of potential interaction eﬀects. We then iteratively throw out
insigniﬁcant eﬀects. After two iterations we ended up with the models presented in
Table 2.1. Note that, by construction, all included interaction eﬀects are signiﬁcant.
As a second approach we ran regressions on the complete 2-factorial set of interaction
factors. The results are presented in Table 2.2 in the Appendix and basically conﬁrm
the analysis discussed here.
The model for investor decisions, presented in the left column of Table 2.1, shows
that wealth positions inﬂuence trusting behavior in treatment EQ, but are of only
minor importance in treatment IEQ. In treatment EQ, the eﬀect of both direct
wealth variables is negative. That is, participants send less the richer they are and
the richer the responder is. However, the positive interaction eﬀect indicates that the
more equal sender and responder are, the less pronounced are the wealth eﬀects. The
lowest send rates are found for poor senders towards rich responders, and vice versa.
Contrary, in treatment IEQ all these three eﬀects are mitigated (see the interaction
eﬀects of Treatment with WSDR, WRSPR, and WSDR WRSPR). These observations
are consistent with the simulation results of the Gini coeﬃcient dynamics. While the
trust decisions in EQ systematically aﬀect the wealth distribution in the economy
20We had to exclude 6 and 314 observations in the models on the send rate and return rate,
respectively, because the send rate is only deﬁned for positive wealth of the investor, and the
return rate is only deﬁned for positive amounts sent. The reason for the 6 observations with a
sender wealth of zero was that a participant erroneously returned her entire round wealth in one
interaction.
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Table 2.1
Determinants of Individual Send and Return Rates
Dependent Variable Send Rate Return Rate
Coeﬃcients (Std.Error) Coeﬃcients (Std.Error)
Round -0.017** (0.001) -0.005** (0.001)
WSDR -0.950** (0.152) -0.080** (0.023)
WRSPR -0.922** (0.145) 0.029 (0.030)
WSDR WRSPR 0.662** (0.142)
Treatment -1.255** (0.198) 0.075* (0.033)
Treatment*Round 0.013** (0.002)
Treatment*WSDR 0.929** (0.160)
Treatment*WRSPR 0.892** (0.151)
Treatment*WSDR*WRSPR -0.631** (0.147)
Run 0.036** (0.011) 0.016 (0.033)
Run*WSDR -0.077* (0.038)
Run*WSDR*WRSPR 0.063* (0.027)
Send rate 0.154** (0.015)
Constant 1.866** (0.173) 0.275** (0.050)
Random Eﬀects
Group Std.Dev. 0.186 (0.045) 0.0001
Subject Std.Dev. 0.264 (0.019) 0.174 (0.013)
Residual Std.Dev. 0.272 (0.004) 0.246 (0.004)
No. of obs. 2554 2246
Wald 2 305.10 249.81
Log-restricted likelihood -529 -207
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * and ** denote signiﬁcance on the 5% and 1%-level,
respectively. Regression models are derived by starting with a full factorial set of interaction
eﬀects and iteratively throwing out insigniﬁcant eﬀects.
beyond what can be expected from non-conditional, homogenous trust patterns, this
is not the case in IEQ.
The eﬀect of the repetition of the game (Run) is positive and corresponds to an
increase of average send rates in the second run of the game, across treatments. With
respect to the evolution of investments over time, we ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of the
number of rounds for treatment EQ, whereas in IEQ the eﬀect of time is somewhat
mitigated. Finally, the coeﬃcient of the treatment dummy is highly signiﬁcant,
pointing out a negative eﬀect of initial inequality introduced by the variation of
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endowments.21
The model for trustee decisions indicates that return rates are generally higher
in treatment IEQ, and shrink over time. We ﬁnd that participants reciprocate high
investments, as the coeﬃcient for the send rate is positive and signiﬁcant: The more
of his wealth the investor sends, the higher his expected proﬁt margin. Rich senders
can expect to earn less from their trusting decisions than poor senders, while there
seems to be no clear eﬀect of the wealth of the responder herself. Also, there are no
signiﬁcant interaction eﬀects between treatment and the relative wealth indicators.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusions
We analyze the behavioral dynamics of economic inequality and trust. In our labo-
ratory economies, participants start with either equal or unequal endowments. They
then repeatedly play an investment game and, by accumulating their payoﬀs, en-
dogenously create growth and wealth distributions. In each round, both transaction
partners are informed about the current wealth of their opponent.
Initially, investments are higher in economies starting with equal endowments
(EQ) compared to the economies starting with unequal endowments (IEQ). However,
in EQ cooperation deteriorates over time, while trust remains stable in IEQ. As a
result, EQ economies initially grow faster, but are ultimately outperformed by the
IEQ economies in terms of eﬃciency. With respect to the distribution of wealth,
IEQ economies become more equal, while EQ economies become more unequal, such
that the distributions of wealth are converging to each other over time.
The diﬀerent dynamics of EQ and IEQ at the aggregate level are mirrored by two
diﬀerences at the individual level. First, there is initially less trust in IEQ. Second,
trust in the EQ economies is conditioned on the investor’s and the trustee’s wealth,
while no analogous eﬀects can be identiﬁed in IEQ. Conditional trust appears to be
the main reason for the downward trend in EQ.
We speculate that the diﬀerences are partly due to the fact that relative wealth
has a diﬀerent information value and source in EQ compared to IEQ economies. A
21Several robustness checks have been conducted with respect to the results of our regressions.
First, Tobit Random Eﬀects models controlling for censored send and return quotas yield the
same results as described above. Second, our main result - the conditioning of trust on sender
and responder wealth - is robust against inclusion of a ‘personal experience’ variable (the average
return rate a sender experienced in previous rounds), and is also present when comparing send
rates from rich/poor senders to rich/poor responders using non-parametric WMPSR tests on the
economy level, not controlling for other factors as in the regression above.
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large relative wealth in EQ is a rather reliable signal for not having been trustworthy
in the past: unfair agents become richer. A large relative wealth in IEQ, on the other
hand, is not only the result of relatively selﬁsh behavior but also of the exogenously
imposed unequal endowments.22 Both, models of strategic and social behavior, are
then in line with the observed patterns of (conditional) trust. Because a higher
wealth tends to suggest lower trustworthiness in EQ (but not in IEQ), richer people
should be trusted less in EQ (but not in IEQ). Moreover, a number of studies (see
for example, Bolton et al., 2005 and Frey et al., 2004) suggest that people are more
tolerant towards inequitable outcomes if inequality is the result of a procedurally
fair allocation mechanism. Finally, a study by Haile et al. (2008) shows that the
willingness to cooperate in a dilemma game depends on the source of inequality.
Thus, to the extent that high wealth exogenously and randomly imposed in
IEQ economies is perceived as fair while high wealth endogenously resulting from
selﬁsh behavior is perceived as unfair, inequality in EQ may invoke a diﬀerent
social response than inequality in IEQ. Modeling the strategic and social roots of
the dynamic interaction of distribution and eﬃciency is left to future research.
22This reasoning is supported by the data. Results of Pearson correlations of average return
rates and ﬁnal wealth in half-runs of treatment EQ are R=-.358, p=.004 and R=-.479, p<.001 for
rounds 1-10 and rounds 11-20 in run 1, and R=-.397, p=.001 and R=-.309, p=.013 for rounds 1-10
and rounds 11-20 in run 2, respectively. Contrary, in treatment IEQ half-run correlations between
average return rates and wealth are low or insigniﬁcant; R=-.142, p=.262 and R=-.048, p=.704
for rounds 1-10 and rounds 11-20 in run 1, and R=-.240, p=.056 and R=-.152, p=.231 for rounds
1-10 and rounds 11-20 in run 2, respectively.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Instructions
Below we include the instructions used in the ﬁrst run of treatment IEQ, translated
from German. Instructions for the other runs and treatments were worded analo-
gously.
Welcome to this experiment! In this experiment you can earn money. How much
money you earn depends on your decisions and the decisions of the other partici-
pants.
From now on, please do not communicate with other participants. If you have a
question concerning the experiment, please raise your hand! We will come to your
place and answer your question privately. If you do not comply with these rules, we
will have to exclude you from the experiment and all payments.
In the experiment, we will use ET (“Experiment-Taler”) as the currency. At the end
of the experiment, your payoﬀ will be converted into Euros and will be paid out in
cash. The exchange rate is 150 ET = 1 Euro. In the experiment, all amounts in ET
are rounded to whole numbers.
The experiment consists of several parts. The payoﬀ of only one of these parts
will be paid out at the end of the experiment. When the experiment is ﬁnished, a
die will be used to determine which part will be used for payment. The following
instructions refer to the ﬁrst part of the experiment. After the ﬁrst part is ﬁnished
you will receive new instructions.
In this part all participants receive an initial endowment. Half of the participants
receive an initial endowment of 800 ET, the other half receive an initial endowment
of 200 ET. It will be determined by chance which participant receives which initial
endowment.
This part consists of 20 rounds. In each round pairs are formed randomly, each
pair consisting of participant A and participant B. It is guaranteed that you do not
interact with the same participant in two consecutive rounds. The roles A and B
within the pair are assigned randomly in every round. The identity of the participant
you are interacting with is secret, and no other participant will be informed about
your identity. In this sense, your decisions are anonymous.
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Every round proceeds as follows:
 At the beginning of the round both participants are informed about their roles
(A or B), the current round (1-20), their own current wealth and the current
wealth of the other participant.
 Then participant A decides how much of his/her wealth he/she wants to send
to participant B.
 The amount sent by participant A is multiplied by 1.2. This means participant
B not only receives the amount sent, but 120 % of the amount sent (1.2*amount
sent).
 Then participant B decides how much he/she sends back to participant A.
He/she must send back at least 90 % of the amount sent (0.9*amount sent).
The upper limit for the amount sent back is the wealth of participant B.
After that the round is over. Wealth at the end of the round is calculated as follows:
 Participant A: Wealth at the end of the round = wealth at the beginning of
the round - amount sent + amount sent back (at least 0.9*amount sent)
 Participant B: Wealth at the end of the round = wealth at the beginning of
the round + 1.2*amount sent - amount sent back (at least 0.9*amount sent)
Wealth at the beginning of a new round is equal to wealth at the end of the preceding
round. The payment for this part in case it is selected is given by the wealth at the
end of the last round of this part.
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2.6.2 Additional Results
Table 2.2
Determinants of Individual Send and Return Rates (2-factorial
Set of Independent Interaction Effects)
Dependent Variable Send Rate Return Rate
Coeﬃcients (Std.Error) Coeﬃcients (Std.Error)
Round -0.012* (0.005) -0.011* (0.005)
WSDR -0.375** (0.076) -0.239** (0.072)
WSDR*Round 0.000 (0.003) 0.006 (0.003)
WRSPR -0.243** (0.065) 0.010 (0.082)
WRSPR*Round -0.005 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003)
WRSPR*WSDR 0.069* (0.035) 0.067 (0.037)
Treatment -0.629** (0.130) 0.075 (0.099)
Treatment*Round 0.013** (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)
Treatment*WSDR 0.308** (0.065) 0.063 (0.047)
Treatment*WRSPR 0.253** (0.043) -0.058 (0.062)
Run 0.120* (0.056) 0.065 (0.063)
Run*Round -0.003 (0.002) -0.006** (0.002)
Run*WSDR 0.025 (0.033) -0.027 (0.033)
Run*WRSPR -0.082* (0.032) 0.076* (0.032)
Run*Treatment 0.014 (0.022) -0.059** (0.021)
Send rate 0.293** (0.074)
Send rate*Round -0.003 (0.002)
Send rate*WSDR -0.013 (0.040)
Send rate*WRSPR -0.095* (0.046)
Send rate*Treatment 0.039 (0.031)
Send rate*Run -.0.038 (0.027)
Constant 1.190** (0.123) 0.330** (0.120)
Random Eﬀects
Group Std.Dev. 0.171 (0.040) 0.000 (0.000)
Subject Std.Dev. 0.265 (0.019) 0.173 (0.012)
Residual Std.Dev. 0.272 (0.004) 0.243 (0.017)
No. of obs. 2554 2246
Wald 2 301.43 299.70
Log-restricted likelihood -500 -156
Standard errors are given in parentheses. * and ** denote signiﬁcance on the 5% and 1%-level,
respectively.
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Chapter 3
Reference Points, Job Satisfaction
and Performance
3.1 Introduction
There is a broad and growing economic literature stressing that reference points
strongly aﬀect how individuals evaluate economic outcomes. But while there are
many theoretical contributions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Gul, 1991; Köszegi
and Rabin, 2006) and some laboratory studies, there is surprisingly little ﬁeld evi-
dence on this issue.1
This lack of research is particularly problematic for the question of optimal in-
centive design in ﬁrms. The main reason is that bonus payments as the typical
key component of incentive schemes are necessarily uncertain and that employees
form expectations about the bonus payment they will receive. Hence, the design of
a bonus scheme may possibly have a strong impact on the formation of reference
points. In turn, implications for the optimal design of incentive schemes are altered
when reference points matter for the behavior of employees (compare de Meza and
Webb, 2007 or Herweg et al., 2008 for recent theoretical contributions).
In this paper we therefore study the causes and eﬀects of reference point for-
mation empirically in the context of bonus plans. We use a unique combination
1A notable exception is for instance the study by Mas (2006) showing that police performance
is sensitive to pay rises compared to reference points set by ﬁnal oﬀer arbitrations. The number of
crimes cleared by arrest decreased signiﬁcantly after arbitrators in a compensation dispute decided
in a way unfavorable to the demand of the police force.
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of administrative personnel data and survey data on managerial employees from a
large multinational company in Germany and the US.
A key feature of our data set is that for each managerial employee in the company
a supervisor has to decide on the percentage of a target bonus paid out under the
constraint that the sum of all bonus payments to his direct subordinates is equal
to the sum of their target bonuses. Hence, the 100% payout percentage generates
a clear reference point for the evaluation of bonus payments. Moreover, while the
computational logic of the plan is exactly the same in the US and Germany, German
employees learn the target bonus and the payout percentage while US employees
only learn the dollar amount leading to a much higher saliency of the reference
point in Germany. A connection of survey, compensation and performance data
on the individual level now enables us to assess incentive and satisfaction eﬀects of
reference point violations in both countries.
We ﬁnd that negative deviations from the 100%-reference point lead to a signi-
ﬁcantly lower reported job satisfaction while positive deviations are not associated
with a signiﬁcant increase in satisfaction. Hence, these results are well in line with
loss aversion postulating that negative deviations from a given reference point de-
crease utility to a stronger extend than positive deviations of the same size (see
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1991 and Kahneman et al.,
1991).
Using panel data on performance assessments, bonus payments and subsequent
supervisor performance, we also ﬁnd that violations of employees’ reference points
negatively aﬀect future performance in the German subsidiary where the reference
point is very salient. This negative eﬀect is robust against alternative speciﬁcations
of reference points, evaluation behavior and team composition.
Our results also add to the literature on social comparisons as the payout percen-
tage reveals information on the relative position of an employee within the relevant
department.2 Hence, they provide ﬁeld evidence on the fair-wage eﬀort hypothesis
proposed by Akerlof and Yellen (1990).3 Moreover, they are well in line with theories
of inequality aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000 and Fehr and Schmidt, 1999)
2There is now broad evidence showing that subjective well-being is highly related to relative
wealth positions (see for instance Frank and Sunstein, 2000 or Clark et al., 2007).
3While there are now numerous experimental studies on the relationship between fair wages and
eﬀort (see for instance Fehr et al., 1993 or Fehr et al., 1997), there is still not much ﬁeld evidence
as it is typically diﬃcult to assess employee performance.
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stating that utility does not depend solely on absolute payoﬀs, but also on relative
payoﬀ comparisons to a reference group.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 describes the survey and the com-
pensation data; section 3.3 presents the results for reported job satisfaction and
performance. In section 3.4, we provide a brief discussion of our results and con-
clude.
3.2 The Data
3.2.1 Survey, Compensation and Performance Data
We use survey and compensation data from managers of a multinational company
(>100,000 employees) operating in diverse business ﬁelds. In cooperation with the
company, we conducted a survey among the managerial staﬀ in Germany (autumn
2007) and the United States (summer 2008). While the system of variable compen-
sation is the same for all managers in the sample, handling of the system diﬀers in
subtle details that are nevertheless decisive for the formation of reference points.
As the survey was part of a larger study, managerial employees were asked some 60
questions about job satisfaction and motivation, workplace characteristics, and per-
sonal preferences on incentive schemes. Together with the survey, we collected per-
sonal data about demographic characteristics, department aﬃliations, performance
evaluations and compensation over the years 2004-2006 (Germany) and 2004-2007
(US). The technical environment allowed us to connect the background data with
survey answers in a way that guaranteed anonymity of the participants. Altogether
4,997 executives took part in the survey (3,122 in Germany and 1,875 in the US).4
3.2.2 Characteristics of the Bonus System
At the end of every business year, individual bonus budgets are determined by
linking company performance, divisional performance, hierarchical level and ﬁxed
salary of a manager. Each supervisor receives the sum of individual bonus budgets
4In the remainder of the paper, we use only data from individuals for which it was possible
to connect survey answers with demographic and compensation data. Comparing participating
and non-participating managers, we do not ﬁnd strong diﬀerences in background or compensation
variables that would limit the representativeness of the sample with respect to the survey answers.
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Table 3.1
Distribution of Performance Ratings
GER 2006 US 2007 Recommended
‘Excellent’ 0.6 2.0  5%
‘Above Average’ 22.4 33.9  25%
‘Average’ 74.1 62.7  60%
‘Below Average’ 2.8 1.4  10%*
‘Inadequate’ 0.1 n/a
*Recommended share refers to the sum of ‘Below Average’ and ‘Inadequate’ employees.
to distribute among the managers in her department. Then, she allocates personal
payout percentages (markups on or reduction below the 100% bonus budget).
Allocation decisions are constrained by the individual performance evaluation of a
person. Each managerial employee is rated on a ﬁve point performance scale (either
‘Excellent’, ‘Above Average’, ‘Average’, ‘Below Average’, or ‘Inadequate’). For each
grade, payout percentage intervals are deﬁned. For example, a person rated ‘Average’
(the large majority of employees) should be assigned between 80% - 110% of her
individual bonus budget. If a supervisor evaluates all her managers with ‘Average’
ratings, she is able to allocate every person the actual budget of 100%. However,
the interrelation between performance ratings and payout percentages makes bonus
assignments a constant-sum game. In the moment a supervisor diﬀerentiates in
ratings, externalities are created by the budget: If one manager receives a bonus
payment larger than 100% of her budget, another manager must necessarily receive
a bonus below 100%.
Bonus payments of German and US managers are roughly comparable during
the period of analysis. Average bonus payments of German managers account for
some some 21,800 USD in 2006 while US managers received some 22,500 USD in
2007 (the years relevant for the survey). Furthermore, average bonuses remain
largely constant over the years in the sample.5 In particular, regular bonuses have
substantial economic importance for the managers, as they account for some 20%
of ﬁxed salaries on average.
Given the connection between ratings and bonuses, an important aspect is the
practice of performance evaluation. Table 3.1 lists the proportions of the perfor-
5It is important, however, that there is a substantial spread of bonus payments between
managers on diﬀerent hierarchy levels.
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mance grades in the year relevant for our survey. The actual shares are contrasted
to the recommended distribution provided by the company.6
We ﬁnd the typical ratings biases often discussed in the literature on subjective
performance evaluations. There is the general tendency to rate employees too posi-
tive (the so-called leniency biases) as well to compress ratings (centrality bias).7 In
Germany, diﬀerentiation is very weak, as the large majority of managers receives
the medium rating ‘Average’. There is only a very small share of excellent ratings
or grades ‘Below Average’ (in sum less than 5%). Supervisors in the US on average
do not diﬀerentiate strongly either. But they assign the highest performance grades
signiﬁcantly more often and the lower-than-average ratings signiﬁcantly less often
than their German counterparts (p<.001 and p=.001, two-sided 2-tests).
Figure 3.1
Distribution of Average Bonus Payout Percentages
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Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of bonus payout percentages in Germany and
the US. Although the bonus system enables supervisors to diﬀerentiate strongly
between employees (theoretically it is possible to assign between 0% and 160% of
the bonus budget), payout percentages are compressed. The large majority of payout
6The company explicitly states that the grading distribution is not a forced distribution but
should rather give supervisors a guideline for their appraisals.
7See Prendergast (1999) for a survey. There is also evidence suggesting that supervisor
evaluation biases also inﬂuence subordinates’ subsequent performance (see the recent study by
Bol, 2008).
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percentages lies close to 100% of the budget. Moreover, the exact bonus budget is
a much stronger focal point for German supervisors: Here, 17.8% of the managers
receive exactly 100% payout compared to 8.3% in the US (signiﬁcant with p<.001,
two-sided 2-test).
This observation can be related to a small but important diﬀerence in system
handling, namely that the mode of communication diﬀers across countries. When
receiving their yearly bonus letters, managers in Germany explicitly learn their per-
sonal payout percentage together with the information about their bonus payments.
In contrast, US managers only get to know the absolute amounts of their bonus
payments without explicitly knowing their bonus budgets.8 We expect the variation
in system handling to have diﬀerent eﬀects on the emergence of the reference point,
as we will explore in the next section.
Finally, in addition to regular bonus payments, supervisors can allocate indivi-
dual spot bonuses to employees, for instance for special achievements or exceptional
performance in particular projects. However, there exist no formal allocation rules,
and the practice of spot bonus allocations diﬀers strongly between supervisors. On
average, supervisors assign spot bonus payments to 30.5% (25.5%) of their managers,
however, the variation in shares is high in both countries. Compared to regular
bonus payments, the economic relevance of these payments is low: The sum of spot
bonuses equals some 3% of the total bonus budget; on average spot bonuses account
for only 1.5 - 2.5% of the respective managers’ yearly income.
3.3 Results
We ﬁrst study the importance of reference point formation in Germany and in the US
by investigating the eﬀect of payout percentages on job satisfaction. In particular,
we focus on the eﬀects of deviations from the conjectured 100% reference point
on individual job satisfaction. In the next step we then study how the frequency
of violations of subordinates’ reference points aﬀects subsequent performance of
supervisors using panel data on evaluations and compensation.
8In principal, US managers may infer their payout percentage. But as the bonus budget is
computed based on a complex formula including divisional and company performance this requires
substantial eﬀort. Open survey answers of US managers convey that this lack of information is
seen as a problematic aspect of the system. Example comments include the statements: “The letter
that comes with the award should clearly spell out your rating”, “At a minimum, the employee
should be told what % was applied”, “Most people have no idea if their award is correct”.
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3.3.1 Reference Points and Job Satisfaction
Our proxy for job satisfaction is the degree of approval to the statement: “I am very
satisﬁed with my job”. Subjects could respond on a scale from 1 (totally disagree) to
7 (fully agree), so that increasing values of the score reﬂect higher satisfaction. The
distributions of answers in the US and Germany are rather similar as table 3.2 shows.
In all model speciﬁcations we use a unit normal transformation of the satisfaction
score in line with Freeman (1978) by subtracting the sample mean from a person’s
score and dividing the result by the standard deviation of the sample.
Table 3.2
Proportions of Answers to the Question “I am very satisfied with
my job”.
GER 2006 US 2007
1 - totally disagree 1.0 1.1
2 3.0 3.9
3 6.0 6.6
4 10.2 13.9
5 27.9 27.5
6 40.0 34.4
7 - fully agree 11.9 12.7
Mean 5.285 5.242
Std.Dev. 1.252 1.253
In the ﬁrst step, we estimate ordered probit regressions with job satisfaction
as the dependent variable for the years 2006 (Germany) and 2007 (US) in which
the surveys took place. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 list alternative speciﬁcations for the
satisfaction models. We control for age, gender, ﬁrm tenure, hierarchical level and
division. Furthermore, in model 1 we also include dummies for each performance
grade with the ‘Average’ category as a reference group.9
First, note that in neither country we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive impact of the
absolute salary or the salary increase on self-reported satisfaction.10
Furthermore, – despite their substantial economic relevance – absolute bonus
payments have no signiﬁcant inﬂuence when we control for the performance grade
9The results reported in the following remain identical if controls for evaluation behavior of the
respective supervisors are also included in the regression models.
10In some speciﬁcations for the US managers, the coeﬃcient of the ﬁxed salary becomes even
negative and signiﬁcant. Additional calculations show, however, that this result can be attributed
to the positive correlation between hierarchy levels and job satisfaction. Once we control for the
correlation between hierarchy levels and ﬁxed salaries, the eﬀect of the latter disappears.
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of a manager.11 This ﬁnding is in line with empirical studies showing little or no
eﬀect of absolute wages on job satisfaction (see Clark and Oswald, 1996 and Clark,
1999).
By contrast, the performance rating signiﬁcantly and robustly inﬂuences job
satisfaction. For both countries, regression coeﬃcients have the expected signs:
Better-than-average ratings are positively associated with satisfaction while the op-
posite is true for lower-than-average ratings. One reason for their high importance
is that they not only inﬂuence short term bonus payments but also long term career
opportunities. In the data set, we ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of the performance rating on
the probability of a future promotion.
Unlike absolute bonus payments, spot bonuses are signiﬁcantly associated with
a higher satisfaction score in Germany.12 In the US, the coeﬃcient of spot bonuses
is also positive but signiﬁcant only in some speciﬁcations. A possible explanation
is that in the US the spot bonus is more similar in nature to the regular bonus
payment as employees typically do not infer the computational logic of the regular
bonus.
In the next step, we focus on the role of payout percentages and the 100% budget
threshold. In speciﬁcation 2 we ﬁrst include the bonus payout percentage.13 In-
deed, we ﬁnd payout percentages to be positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with
reported satisfaction. However, following the literature on the eﬀect of reference
point violations on utility, we expect that the relation of payout percentages and
satisfaction is non-linear. At this point, we exploit the fact that the system provides
the clear reference point of 100% bonus budget for each individual. Therefore, in
model 3 we split payout percentages into those above and those below 100% bonus
budget and allow for the possibility that the eﬀect of the bonus payout percentage
has diﬀerent slope above than below the reference point. This model is deﬁned as
JobSatisfactioni = + Xi+  (zi 100) Izi>100%+  (100 zi) Izi<100%+"i
with zi being the payout percentage of individual i and Izi>100% (Izi<100%) is a
11Please note that if performance ratings are excluded, absolute payments become signiﬁcant in
the German sample, see model 5, table 3.6 in the Appendix.
12This is in line with the results of Engellandt and Riphahn (2004) indicating a positive relation
between surprise bonuses and subsequent overtime hours.
13As the performance grades determine the intervals from which the percentages can be selected
we omit the performance grades in this speciﬁcation.
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Table 3.3
Determinants of Job Satisfaction – Germany (Dependent Variable:
Adjusted Satisfaction Score)
Country GER GER GER GER
No. 1 2 3 4
Model Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered
Probit Probit Probit Probit
Fixed Salary (000s) 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.002
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006]
Salary Increase (000s) 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.005
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006]
Spot Bonus (000s) 0.042** 0.045** 0.046** 0.051*
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.028]
Performance Rating 0.480*
‘Excellent’ [0.276]
Performance Rating 0.279***
‘Above Average’ [0.064]
Performance Rating -0.920***
‘Below Average’ [0.166]
Performance Rating -1.08
‘Inadequate’ [0.732]
Absolute Bonus Payout (000s) -0.007
[0.010]
Bonus Payout Percentage 0.013***
[0.002]
Positive Deviation from Bonus 0.005 -0.002
Budget (=100%) [0.003] [0.012]
Negative Deviation from Bonus -0.023*** -0.022***
Budget (=100%) [0.004] [0.006]
Sample All All All ‘Average’
Observations 2094 2099 2099 1545
log-likelihood -3181 -3198 -3193 -2369
Standard errors are given in brackets. *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance on the 10%, 5% and
1%-level, respectively. Demographic control variables include a manager‘s age and gender, total
years of aﬃliation to the company and at a given hierarchy level, dummies for hierarchy levels and
for promotion in the last year.
dummy variable taking the value 1 if the payout percentage is above 100% (below
100%). Hence,  captures the eﬀect of a positive deviation and  of a negative de-
viation from the 100% budget. If 100% indeed constitutes a reference point relative
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Table 3.4
Determinants of Job Satisfaction – US (Dependent Variable:
Adjusted Satisfaction Score)
Country US US US US
No. 1 2 3 4
Model Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered
Probit Probit Probit Probit
Fixed Salary (000s) -0.003 -0.003 -0.005* -0.005
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
Salary Increase (000s) -0.019 -0.017 -0.02 0.007
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.022]
Spot Bonus (000s) 0.033 0.041* 0.050** 0.051
[0.025] [0.024] [0.025] [0.043]
Performance Rating 0.551**
‘Excellent’ [0.248]
Performance Rating 0.199***
‘Above Average’ [0.075]
Performance Rating -1.213***
‘Below Average’ [0.295]
Performance Rating
‘Inadequate’
Absolute Bonus Payout (000s) -0.004
[0.006]
Bonus Payout Percentage 0.006**
[0.003]
Positive Deviation from Bonus 0.006 0.003
Budget (=100%) [0.006] [0.008]
Negative Deviation from Bonus -0.021*** -0.002
Budget (=100%) [0.006] [0.005]
Sample All All All ‘Average’
Observations 1008 1010 957 633
log-likelihood -1553 -1569 -1481 -999
Standard errors are given in brackets. *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance on the 10%, 5% and
1%-level, respectively. Demographic control variables include a manager‘s age and gender, total
years of aﬃliation to the company and at a given hierarchy level, dummies for hierarchy levels and
for promotion in the last year.
to which employees evaluate their bonus payment, we expect  and  to be diﬀerent
from each other. In particular, loss aversion would imply that jj < jj.
Indeed, model 3 shows that decreases below 100% have a signiﬁcantly nega-
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tive eﬀect on satisfaction levels while increases above 100% do not increase self-
reported satisfaction in both countries. However, given the strong negative impact
of lower than average performance evaluations on satisfaction, we have to rule out the
possibility that the presumed reference point eﬀect is not in fact driven by ratings.
We control for this possibility by estimating model 3 with a reduced sample inclu-
ding only employees who receive an ‘Average’ rating (model 4). In this speciﬁcation,
the reference point eﬀect remains robust and highly signiﬁcant for Germany. For
the US, however, the eﬀect disappears entirely. Recall that in Germany the em-
ployees directly learn the payout percentage and the 100% budget is therefore a
very prominent reference point. Contrary, US managers do not orientate on their
personal budgets, and negative deviations from the personal budget do not lower
their satisfaction accordingly.
These conclusions remain identical in a number of robustness checks presented in
tables 3.6 and 3.7 in the Appendix. First, we test if payout percentages inﬂuence
job satisfaction per se when controlling for performance ratings (models 6 and 7).
In model 6, we restrict our analysis again to managers with an ‘Average’ rating. In
Germany, the eﬀect of payout percentages is positive and signiﬁcant whereas it is
not signiﬁcant in the US. Model 7 (calculated over the whole sample) captures the
relation between ratings and payout percentages by including interaction terms.14
Again, the positive relation between payout percentages and satisfaction remains
signiﬁcant in the German sample and disappears in the US sample.
Finally, the asymmetric eﬀect of deviations from the 100% budget on job satis-
faction remains equally robust in the German sample if dummies for ratings and the
corresponding interaction eﬀects are included (model 8).15
To further conﬁrm and quantify the reference point violation eﬀect, we calculate
an additional OLS model with adjusted satisfaction as the dependent variable (see
table 3.8 in the Appendix). In addition, we include ﬁxed eﬀects per supervisor
to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Instead of payout percentage values we
14Average payout percentages per rating account for some 139%, 114%, 98%, 71% and 0% for the
ratings ‘Excellent’, ‘Above Average’, ‘Average’, ‘Below Average’, and ‘Inadequate’ in the German
sample. The corresponding values in the US sample are 127%, 109%, 95% and 60%. The lowest
rating ‘Inadequate’ was not assigned by US supervisors.
15In model 8, the interaction variable Negative Deviation X ‘Above Average’ is included in the
US sample. The reason is that for some managers with this rating, US supervisors discretionally
assigned bonuses outside the relevant percentage intervals. However, less than 10 observations in
our sample fall under this category.
37
Figure 3.2
Estimated Relation between Payout Percentage Intervals and Job
Satisfaction relative to Managers in the [100%,105%[ Interval
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The ﬁgure shows the estimated eﬀect of payout percentage intervals on adjusted job satisfaction,
controlling for compensation, performance rating, and demographic background of the managers
(see table 3.8 in the Appendix). Mean predicted values per payout percentage interval are derived
from a linear model with ﬁxed eﬀects for supervisors.
include dummies for percentage intervals. The reference group consists of managers
with payout percentages from the [100%; 105%[ interval. In the German sample, all
dummies below 100% have negative signs and are signiﬁcant in most cases, indicating
a lower satisfaction score compared to managers around the threshold. Dummies
for intervals above 100% are insigniﬁcant and small in size. Corresponding to the
expected low importance of the reference point (and the non-transparency of the
payout percentage) there is no clear tendency in the US and most interval dummies
are insigniﬁcant.
A graphical display of the results is shown in ﬁgure 3.2. For the graph, we
compute the estimated adjusted satisfaction score derived from the regression model
for each manager. We calculate for each percentage interval the average satisfaction
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score and subtract the average score of the reference group, i.e. managers in the
[100%; 105%[ interval. In the case of Germany, estimated scores exhibit roughly the
kinked shape around the reference point implied by loss aversion: Managers with
a higher percentage payout exhibit only a marginally higher satisfaction on ave-
rage relative to the control group. In contrast, the further away payout percentage
intervals are from the reference interval, the stronger is the detrimental eﬀect on
job satisfaction.16 Furthermore, the described relation remains equally robust if the
analysis is restricted to ‘Average’ managers. For the US managers, no clear tendency
is observable.
3.3.2 Reference Points and Performance
So far, we only examined the eﬀect of reference point violation on a subjective survey
measure. But especially from an economic point of view it is important to study
whether reference point violations have consequences for employee performance. To
address incentive eﬀects of the system handling, we use the performance ratings of
a supervisor as a proxy measure for the performance of the respective team of her
subordinates.
If reference point violations negatively aﬀect performance we should expect that
a higher frequency of employees with a payout percentage below 100% in one year
lead to a reduced supervisor performance in the subsequent year. Due to the panel
structure of our data, we can track the supervisors’ evaluation behavior and their
own performance grades over several years. We therefore study the following speci-
ﬁcation
Ratingit+1 = +  DevRefit +  Xit + ai + t + "it
where Xit is a vector of individual background variables of a supervisor i in
year t, ai are supervisor ﬁxed eﬀects and t are year dummies. We use a unit
normal transformation of the performance rating as the dependent variable. Besides
organizational aﬃliations and hierarchy levels, the background variables include
compensation data (ﬁxed salary and salary increase) and evaluation behavior in
year t. For the latter, we use the shares of employees rated ‘Excellent’, ‘Above
16Managers in the [85%; 90%[ interval are outliers in the trend both for the German and the US
sample. However, there is no systematic reason related to the compensation scheme or the practice
of performance evaluation that could explain this observation.
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Average’ and ‘Below Average’ by the supervisor.17
Our hypothesis is that the share of employees rated below the 100% reference
point (measured by DevRefit) in year t by supervisor i has a negative eﬀect on his
performance in year t + 1. We control for unobserved supervisor heterogeneity by
including ﬁxed eﬀects. In addition, it is important to account for for the general
evaluation behavior of the supervisor by including the relative shares of all perfor-
mance grades he assigned to his subordinates. The reason for the latter is that this
grading distribution determines the restrictions under which the supervisor can dis-
tribute the budget. By controlling for the distribution of grades we study the eﬀect
of variations in the choice to violate the 100% reference point for given budgeting
restrictions. Table 3.5 reports the results for Germany and the United States.
In the models, we use the unit-normal transformation of a supervisor‘s perfor-
mance rating in t+ 1 as the dependent variable. Across countries we ﬁnd results in
line with the regressions on reported satisfaction. Controlling for the background
and the evaluation behavior of the supervisor, reference point violations negatively
aﬀect supervisor performance in Germany. Thus, the more managers are reduced
below 100% budget in a given year, the lower is estimated performance in the next
year. This result suggests that reference point violation not only decreases job satis-
faction, but also mitigates incentives. A given supervisor discourages her managers
when violating reference points, and subsequently should take this into account when
deciding about bonus assignments.
In the US data, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of reference point violations.
As managers do not orientate strongly on the reference point of 100% budget, per-
formance is not negatively aﬀected. Supervisors can therefore achieve a stronger
variation in payments among the managers in their departments. At the same time,
the absence of the reference point enables supervisors to assign a higher share of
‘Above Average’ ratings to their subordinates, because budgetary pressure is lower.
This corresponds to the observation that in the US some 11% more of the managers
receive ‘Above Average’ than in Germany.18
Furthermore, the reported eﬀect of reference point violation remains equally ro-
17We include no dummy for the rating ‘Inadequate’, because only a negligible share of supervisors
used this rating throughout the years in our sample.
18Please note that managers rated ‘Average’ in the US receive about 3% less of their budgets
than in Germany. Among supervisors who belong to the quartile with the strongest dispersion in
performance ratings, this diﬀerence even increases to more than 7% on average.
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Table 3.5
Incentive Effects of Reference Point Violations (Dependent
Variable: Performance Rating of Supervisor in Subsequent Year)
Dependent Variable Adjusted Adjusted Adjusted
Rating Rating Rating
Country GER GER US
No. 1 2 1
Model Fixed Fixed Fixed
Eﬀects Eﬀects Eﬀects
Share of Managers rated ‘Average’ -0.825** -0.828** 0.211
and awarded below 100% [0.403] [0.368] [0.278]
Fixed Salary 0.062* 0.075 -0.031
[0.035] [0.157] [0.022]
Salary Increase -0.009 0.089 0.025*
[0.012] [0.093] [0.014]
Constant 3.990* -9.047 4.874
[2.063] [14.795] [3.314]
Sample Full Restricted Full
Observations 367 86 297
Number of Supervisors 249 71 176
R-squared (within) 0.20 0.49 0.19
Standard errors are given in brackets. *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance on the 10%, 5% and
1%-level, respectively. Demographic control variables include the age of the supervisor, total years
of her aﬃliation to the company, correction for part-time employment and evaluation behavior
measured by the share of respective performance ratings.
bust in Germany if we calculate model 1 with a reduced sample (model 2). Here,
we include supervisors who assigned solely ‘Average’ ratings to their subordinates.19
Due to the lack of diﬀerentiation in ratings, these supervisors are not restricted in
bonus assignments by budgetary concerns. Thus, performance eﬀects of reference
point violations do not interact with evaluation behavior of the supervisor in this
subsample. Again, the coeﬃcient of the share of managers below 100% remains
negative and highly signiﬁcant.
19In the US sample, assigning only ‘Average’ ratings is much less frequent among supervisors. In
fact, there are not enough observations in the sample to calculate model 2, as only 30 observations
in the data set fall under this category in the respective years.
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A ﬁnal observation is that - in contrast to job satisfaction models - compensation
variables have signiﬁcant positive eﬀects in some speciﬁcations. Here, the data
suggests that higher ﬁxed salaries (Germany) and stronger salary increases (United
States) are correlated with higher performance in the subsequent year.
The eﬀects of reference point violations in Germany (and the lack of an eﬀect
in the US) remain robust in alternative speciﬁcations. Table 3.9 in the Appendix
lists models with alternative measures for reference point violation to validate our
previous statements. First, we include the mean payout percentages per supervi-
sor for ‘Average’ managers as an alternative measure for reference point violation
(see model 3). The respective coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant for Germany,
indicating that a stronger reduction in payments of ‘Average’ managers decreases
incentives accordingly. Second, our main result could be driven by general ﬁnan-
cial constraints of the supervisor rather than behavioral eﬀects of reference point
violation. Therefore, we control for absolute bonus budgets per supervisor (model
4). The less budget per capita a supervisor is able to distribute, the more managers
have to be reduced below the threshold for a given ratings distribution. However,
the inclusion of bonus budgets does not have a signiﬁcant impact for both countries,
and the eﬀect of reference point violation remains robust for Germany.
Summarizing, our data provides evidence that reference point violation does not
only aﬀect employee perception but also performance. As in the case of satisfaction,
our results highlight the impacts of diﬀerences in system handling: If orientation
on the individual budget is fostered by the system, negative deviations from this
reference point have detrimental eﬀects. However, if the reference point is not salient,
there is no negative eﬀect on performance found if managers’ bonus payments are
reduced below the individual budgets.
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3.4 Discussion and Conclusions
We have conducted an empirical study in which we connect demographic, compen-
sation and performance data with survey results to derive insights about the rele-
vance of reference points for the design of bonus schemes. Comparing managerial
employees in the United States and Germany, we ﬁnd eﬀects consistent with loss
aversion when reference points are very salient. Negative deviations from a natural
reference point induced by the bonus system signiﬁcantly reduce self-reported job
satisfaction levels, whereas positive deviations have little inﬂuence. Moreover, vio-
lations of subordinates’ reference points also harm performance, as the supervisor’s
own ratings are reduced when they assign payout percentages below personal bud-
gets to a higher share of their subordinates. In the US, system handling diﬀers in a
way that prevents the formation of reference points, as personal payout percentages
are not explicitly communicated. Subsequently, the described detrimental eﬀects of
reference point violations are not observed.
It is important to note that the exhibited patterns are not only in line with loss
aversion but also with theories of inequality aversion. In the present bonus system,
the 100% reference point coincides with a ‘social reference’: When having a payout
percentage below 100%, an employee knows that she receives a lower bonus payment
than the average fellow employee in the same unit.
From our analysis, two main ﬁelds for further research can be derived in the
context of bonus schemes. First, our results suggest that transparency may be
a double-edged sword. On the one hand, transparency may increase procedural
fairness perceptions of compensation schemes or wage changes (see, for example,
the psychological studies by Schaubroeck et al., 2000 and Werner and Ones, 2000).
But as we have shown, transparency can also be detrimental as it may trigger
relative social comparisons and the formation of precise expectations which may
eventually be disappointed.20 At the same time, however, low transparency provides
supervisors with more degrees of freedom when deciding about bonus payments to
their employees. In our sample, US supervisors are able to diﬀerentiate more between
their subordinates, apparently because they do not have to care so much about the
violation of their subordinates’ reference points.
Second, our study does not identify the reference point dependent concerns;
20This is also in line with experimental ﬁndings suggesting that a lack of transparency may
dampen social comparison eﬀects (see for instance Gehrig et al., 2007)
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managers may compare their bonus relative to their individual bonus target or
relative to their peer group, or to both. In fact, we believe that one reason for
why we ﬁnd strong reference point eﬀects is that diﬀerent reference points coincide:
falling behind my individual target implies falling behind the peer group because
the bonus not paid to me goes to my peers. However, it would be interesting to
know the contribution of each of those eﬀects for our results.
As our study shows, it is highly important to take behavioral eﬀects into ac-
count when making recommendations for incentive plan design in practice. Small
diﬀerences in handling may have large eﬀects on the perception of the employees
and the subsequent incentive eﬀects. At the moment, the research on behavioral
incentive design is only starting.
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3.5 Appendix
Table 3.6
Determinants of Job Satisfaction (Germany) – Robustness Checks
Country GER GER GER GER
No. 5 6 7 8
Model Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered
Probit Probit Probit Probit
Fixed Salary (000s) -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003
[0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
Salary Increase (000s) 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.006
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
Spot Bonus (000s) 0.058*** 0.051* 0.036* 0.036*
[0.021] [0.028] [0.022] [0.022]
Performance Rating 7.950* 2.129*
‘Excellent’ [4.127] [1.214]
Performance Rating 3.302*** 0.399***
‘Above Average’ [0.845] [0.106]
Performance Rating -0.454 -0.540
‘Below Average’ [1.058] [0.426]
Performance Rating 0.472
‘Inadequate’ [0.841]
Absolute Bonus Payout (000s) 0.025***
[0.008]
Bonus Payout Percentage 0.015*** 0.015***
[0.005] [0.005]
Positive Deviation from Bonus 0.000
Budget (=100%) [0.012]
Negative Deviation from Bonus -0.021***
Budget (=100%) [0.006]
‘Excellent’ X Percentage -0.058**
[0.029]
‘Above Average’ X Percentage -0.029***
[0.008]
‘Below Average’ X Percentage -0.001
[0.014]
Positive Deviation X -0.043
‘Excellent’ [0.031]
Positive Deviation X -0.014
‘Above Average’ [0.013]
Negative Deviation X 0.006
‘Below Average’ [0.015]
Negative Deviation X 0.010
‘Inadequate’ [0.009]
Sample All ‘Average’ All All
Observations 2099 1545 2094 2094
log-likelihood -3213 -2370 -3172 -3171
Standard errors are given in brackets. *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance on the 10%, 5% and
1%-level, respectively. Demographic control variables include a manager‘s age and gender, total
years of aﬃliation to the company and at a given hierarchy level, dummies for hierarchy levels and
for promotion in the last year.
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Table 3.7
Determinants of Job Satisfaction (US) – Robustness Checks
Country US US US US
No. 5 6 7 8
Model Ordered Ordered Ordered Ordered
Probit Probit Probit Probit
Fixed Salary (000s) -0.006* -0.005 -0.006** -0.006*
[0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
Salary Increase (000s) -0.016 0.007 -0.021 -0.020
[0.015] [0.022] [0.015] [0.015]
Spot Bonus (000s) 0.045* 0.065 0.033 0.039
[0.024] [0.044] [0.025] [0.025]
Performance Rating -2.882 0.455
‘Excellent’ [2.061] [0.809]
Performance Rating 1.782** 0.171
‘Above Average’ [0.694] [0.133]
Performance Rating -2.114 -0.484
‘Below Average’ [1.513] [0.986]
Absolute Bonus Payout (000s) 0.007
[0.006]
Bonus Payout Percentage 0.004 0.002
[0.008] [0.004]
Positive Deviation from Bonus -0.003
Budget (=100%) [0.025]
Negative Deviation from Bonus -0.004
Budget (=100%) [0.010]
‘Excellent’ X Percentage 0.027
[0.017]
‘Above Average’ X Percentage -0.015**
[0.007]
‘Below Average’ X Percentage 0.016
[0.024]
Positive Deviation X 0.010
‘Excellent’ [0.037]
Positive Deviation X -0.001
‘Above Average’ [0.027]
Negative Deviation X -0.014
‘Below Average’ [0.026]
Negative Deviation X 0.058
‘Above Average’ [0.082]
Sample All ‘Average’ All All
Observations 1010 599 1008 957
log-likelihood -1572 -947 -1548 -1475
Standard errors are given in brackets. *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance on the 10%, 5% and
1%-level, respectively. Demographic control variables include a manager‘s age and gender, total
years of aﬃliation to the company and at a given hierarchy level, dummies for hierarchy levels and
for promotion in the last year.
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Table 3.8
Determinants of Job Satisfaction - Reference Point Effects
Country GER US
No. 9 9
Model OLS OLS
Fixed Salary (000s) 0.004 -0.009**
[0.006] [0.004]
Salary Increase (000s) 0.000 -0.031
[0.006] [0.020]
Spot Bonus (000s) 0.029 -0.037
[0.026] [0.039]
Performance Rating 0.112 0.875**
‘Excellent’ [0.323] [0.422]
Performance Rating -0.041 0.236
‘Above Average’ [0.136] [0.218]
Performance Rating -0.162 -1.327*
‘Below Average’ [0.411] [0.760]
Performance Rating -0.24
‘Inadequate’ [0.945]
Payout <80% -0.852* -0.030
[0.466] [0.623]
80%  Payout <85% -0.574*** -0.724*
[0.173] [0.410]
85%  Payout <90% -0.087 0.128
[0.156] [0.351]
90%  Payout <95% -0.304*** -0.172
[0.104] [0.250]
95%  Payout <100% -0.087 -0.237
[0.083] [0.197]
105%  Payout <110% 0.025 -0.203
[0.106] [0.216]
Payout  110% 0.069 -0.134
[0.149] [0.263]
Observations 2093 957
Number of Supervisors 707 535
R-squared (within) 0.06 0.09
The models include ﬁxed eﬀects calculated on the level of supervisors. Standard errors are given in
brackets. *,** and *** denote signiﬁcance on the 10%, 5% and 1%-level, respectively. Demographic
control variables include a manager‘s age and gender, total years of aﬃliation to the company and
at a given hierarchy level as well as dummies for hierarchy levels and promotion in the last year.
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Table 3.9
Incentive Effects of Reference Point Violations – Robustness
Checks
Dependent Variable Adjusted Adjusted Adjusted Adjusted
Rating Rating Rating Rating
Country GER GER US US
No. 3 4 3 4
Model Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Eﬀects Eﬀects Eﬀects Eﬀects
Share of Managers rated -0.814** 0.222
‘Average’ below 100% [0.404] [0.280]
Fixed Salary 0.064* 0.064* -0.031 -0.031
[0.035] [0.036] [0.024] [0.023]
Salary Increase -0.009 -0.009 0.032** 0.024
[0.012] [0.012] [0.015] [0.015]
Mean Payout Percentage 0.056** -0.002
for ‘Average’ Managers [0.026] [0.006]
Bonus Budget per Employee -0.033 0.013
[0.049] [0.026]
Constant -7.987 4.369** 3.570 4.687
[14.132] [2.143] [3.628] [3.346]
Observations 365 367 270 297
Number of Supervisors 248 249 164 176
R-squared (within) 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.19
Standard errors are given in brackets. *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance on the 10%, 5% and
1%-level, respectively. Demographic control variables include the age of the supervisor, total years
of her aﬃliation to the company, correction for part-time employment and evaluation behavior
measured by the share of respective performance ratings.
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Chapter 4
Social Comparisons in a Real-Eﬀort
Experiment
4.1 Introduction
When designing compensation schemes, the natural question from a company’s
perspective is how to diﬀerentiate between wages of employees with diﬀerent produc-
tivity. Standard theory implies that in equilibrium each worker should be paid her
marginal product. Frank (1984a) shows that the distribution of wages observed in
the real world is less dispersed – more compressed – than the distribution of worker’s
marginal products. In a formalization of this argument, Frank (1984b) shows that
the existence of rank-dependent preferences may lead to more compressed wages.
However, in this model, a worker’s productivity is ﬁxed and given exogenously. It
seems rather plausible to assume that workers’ eﬀorts and performance depend on
their relative wage, although the sign of this relationship is not clear per se. On the
one hand, low relative (piece-rate) wages might increase worker’s eﬀorts as a mean
to overcome the dispersion of income. On the other hand, low relative pay might
crowd out a worker’s motivation.
In this experimental study, the focus is on the eﬀect of social comparisons with
respect to discriminatory wage increases and decreases. Our aim is to disentangle
the direct performance eﬀect of wage changes from the indirect eﬀect induced by
changes in relative positions.
Participants in our experiment are hired to carry out simple but laborious typing
tasks. We allow for shirking by paying only for quantity, but not for (not imme-
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diately observable) quality of work. While identical wages are paid for a ﬁrst task,
we introduce wage diﬀerentials in a similar second task. Our design tests both a
ﬁxed and in a piece-rate wage environment, and controls for the eﬀect of social
comparisons by varying information about co-workers’ wages.
The importance of social comparisons is reﬂected in behavioral responses to wage
changes in our treatment with piece-rates. Information about peer wages triggers
performance diﬀerences between high wage and low wage subjects that are ab-
sent when wages are identical or peer information is not provided. This eﬀect is
mainly driven by negative responses of participants with lower wages who become
more likely to cheat in the second task. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that
wage increases trigger positive adjustments among high wage subjects, as errors at-
tributable to inaccuracy signiﬁcantly decrease in the second task. In general, eﬀects
in the ﬁxed-wage environment – as compared to piece-rate wages – are qualitatively
similar but largely mitigated and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Section 4.2 gives a short overview on the related empirical and experimental lite-
rature. In Section 4.3, we present the details of our experimental design and intro-
duce hypotheses about expected behavior. Our results are reported in Section 4.4,
and we brieﬂy conclude in Section 4.5.
4.2 Related Literature
In the laboratory, agency problems of employment relationships are mostly studied
in the framework of the ‘gift exchange’ game introduced by Fehr et al. (1993).1 In
this game, the employer sets a ﬁxed wage, and the employee makes a costly ‘eﬀort’
choice. While strict rationality implies minimum wages and eﬀorts, a substantial
share of employers pay higher-than-minimum wages in this kind of setting, and
employees reciprocate by choosing higher-than-minimum eﬀort levels.
Some variations of the gift exchange game are devoted to the eﬀects of social
comparisons between multiple workers – the results, however, are ambiguous. A
number of studies suggest an inﬂuence of wage diﬀerentials and social comparison
on eﬀort exertion: In the study by Clark et al. (forthcoming), workers were informed
about the wages oﬀered to other workers prior to their eﬀort choices. The authors
found evidence for the impact of relative income, as eﬀort choices increased with the
1See Gächter and Fehr (2001) for a survey of numerous variations.
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rank of a worker’s wage in the population. Rivas and Sutter (2008) conducted an
experiment in which one principal was matched with four agents of diﬀering produc-
tivity. Controlling for a worker’s own wage, eﬀort decreased with rising inequality
among the agents. Finally, in the repeated game studied by Abeler et al. (forth-
coming), eﬀort had to be provided before wages were set. Here, eﬀorts diminished
over time when the employer had no possibility to discriminate in wages between
workers choosing diﬀerent eﬀort levels.
Other gift exchange experiments found no robust correlation between peer pay-
ments and eﬀort levels. Charness and Kuhn (2007) conducted a study in which a
ﬁrm was matched with two workers of diﬀering productivity. Here, the informa-
tion about the co-worker’s wage was only of minor importance. In a gift exchange
game with one principal and two agents, Gächter et al. (2008) found that co-workers’
wages had an inﬂuence only if subjects were additionally provided information about
co-workers’ corresponding eﬀort choices.
There are a few experimental studies which try to bridge the gap between the
laboratory and the real work environment and let participants perform real tasks
rather than making theoretical “eﬀort” choices. In a psychological real-eﬀort ﬁeld ex-
periment, Greenberg (1987) showed that fair (performance-based) and unfair (room
number-based) procedures to assign wages yield diﬀerent willingness to accept a low
wage. In a further study, Greenberg (1988) reported that workers assigned to of-
ﬁces associated with lower (higher) status decreased (increased) their performance.
Burchett and Willoughby (2004) compared performance of experimental subjects
under alternative initial reward systems (ﬂat payment versus high and low piece
rates). It turned out that diﬀerent systems resulted in performance diﬀerences only
if subjects were informed about the existence of these diﬀerences. Hennig-Schmidt
et al. (forthcoming) measured the eﬀects of pay increases of diﬀering sizes for real
eﬀort tasks conducted in the lab and in the ﬁeld and found no direct eﬀect on per-
formance. They found positive eﬀects on eﬀorts only when workers were informed
about the surplus their activity created for the employer.
Several studies provide evidence for the impact of relative wage positions for sur-
vey measures of job satisfaction. While the inﬂuence of absolute wages seemed to
be limited (Clark, 1999), income increases of peers in comparable positions were
associated with signiﬁcant declines in reported job satisfaction (Clark and Oswald,
1996).2 In a survey study among US colleges and university faculties, Pfeﬀer and
2Please note that the reference group appears to have a decisive impact. In a recent study, Clark
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Langton (1993) found – consistent with rank preferences – that satisfaction was
positively correlated with relative positions, and average satisfaction increased with
lower salary variation. Evidence for the incentive eﬀect of relative wages is pro-
vided by Torgler et al. (2008) who showed that German soccer players’ individual
performances were sensitive to their income positions within their teams.
Finally, a strain of literature investigates behavioral eﬀects of wage changes. In
a ﬁeld experiment conducted by Fehr and Goette (2007), an exogenous wage in-
crease had a positive impact on labor supply of bicycle messengers. Bellemare and
Shearer (2007) found that a temporary wage increase had positive eﬀects on produc-
tivity of workers in a tree-planting company. However, several laboratory and ﬁeld
experiments showed that positive responses to wage increases are weaker than neg-
ative responses to wage decreases (see Gneezy and List, 2006; Kube et al., 2007).
Moreover, psychological experiments provide evidence that wage freezes or wage
cuts result in negative reactions of employees, such as declining employee satisfac-
tion (Schaubroeck et al., 2000) or an increase of employee theft (Greenberg, 1990).
4.3 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
The experiment consisted of two identical working tasks which both lasted 20
minutes.3 Participants were provided with a staple of questionnaire forms ﬁlled
in by participants in an unrelated class room experiment. The subjects were asked
to type in the 15 decimal numbers found on each form into an input mask on the
computer screen.4 Participants were told that the data from these questionnaires
were required in electronic form for research purposes. It was known that the cor-
rectness of entries was not checked prior to payments, giving rise to the possibility
to shirk by ﬁlling in arbitrary values.5 This speciﬁc working task was chosen for two
reasons: First, it allowed the precise measurement of working performance with re-
spect to both quantity and quality. Second, demands to subjects were not diﬀerent
et al. (2009) found that co-worker wages as signals for future earnings were positively related to
job satisfaction measures.
3Instructions translated from German can be found in Appendix 4.6.1.
4See Figure 4.3 in Appendix 4.6.1 for a screenshot.
5We limited the possibilities for shirking in two dimensions: First, only 50 forms were distributed
in each task, therefore limiting achievable payments in the piece-rate treatment. In addition, the
software required subjects to ﬁll in a number into each ﬁeld of the input mask to be able to continue
to the next input mask.
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to usual economic experiments: reading text and ﬁlling in a form at the computer
screen.
At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly assigned to either group
A or group B, and received instructions in a red (A) or blue (B) envelope. For the
ﬁrst task all subjects were paid identical wages. In the second task, each participant
in group A received a 60% wage increase, while the wages of participants in group
B were cut by the same share.6 All participants were assigned the same set of
questionnaires.
To systematically study the eﬀects of these wage changes, we implemented a
2x2 design. In the private information dimension, participants were only informed
about their own wage. In the public information condition, A (B) participants were
informed that they were assigned to a B (A) participant working on the exact same
set of questionnaires, and were told the other participant’s wage. This allows us
to isolate the impact of social comparisons from direct eﬀects of wage in- and de-
creases. In the second design dimension, participants either received a ﬁxed wage for
the task, or a piece-rate wage, i.e. a wage depending linearly on the number of forms
ﬁlled in. Thus, while under a piece-rate wage participants could shirk in quality,
but not in quantity, none of these two eﬀort dimensions was contractible in the ﬁxed
wage conditions. Our analysis will include all three performance measures: quan-
tity (number of completed questionnaires), quality (share of correct questionnaires)
dimension, as well as net output, i.e. the number of correct questionnaires.
If eﬀort is costly, and participants are egoistic and view the work tasks as a one-
shot interaction with the experimenters, then we should observe no eﬀort under ﬁxed
wages and minimal eﬀort (full quantity with zero quality) under piece-rate wages.
In any case, participants should not produce any usable output, and there should
be no treatment eﬀects (Null hypothesis).
However, if – as intended – participants understand the experiment as a real
world working task, and they believe to be in a repeated game context and/or
behave reciprocal to provided wages, we would expect them to produce some usable
output (hypothesis 1).7 To organize behavioral hypotheses with respect to wage
6It is important to note that wage changes were not related to any performance measure, and
subjects had no possibility to assess their own performance relative to the others.
7In our setting, experimental subjects face a multi-tasking problem, because they have to
allocate eﬀort between working quantity (number of completed questionnaires) and working
quality (avoidance of mistaken entries). For theoretical considerations on multi-tasking problems
see Lazear (1986), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and, for a survey of the literature, Prendergast
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changes in this case, we distinguish between two possible eﬀects of our treatment
variations: the eﬀect of wage changes under private wage information, and the eﬀect
of social comparison when information about peer wages is provided.
Under private information and in a ﬁxed wage environment, where no work di-
mension is contractible, reciprocal reactions to a wage change would predict in-
creased (decreased) eﬀort and output after a wage increase (decrease) (hypothesis
2a). Under straightforward piece-rate wages, the same eﬀect would be predicted
by reciprocity or by a standard assumption of increasing marginal costs of eﬀort
(hypothesis 2b). However, the asymmetry in observability of quantity and quality
complicates a prediction, as a wage change may additionally induce a shift of ef-
fort from the unobservable quality dimension to the observable quantity dimension,
speciﬁcally for a wage cut (hypothesis 2c).
With information on peer wages, rank-dependent or otherwise distribution-based
preferences might interact with the direct eﬀects of wage changes. In general, the
eﬀects described above might be fortiﬁed (hypothesis 3a, e.g. crowding out of mo-
tivation after wage cuts) or mitigated (hypothesis 3b, e.g. additional incentives to
improve relative income position after wage cut). However, given existing empirical
evidence about the impacts of relative ranks, we would expect that speciﬁcally the
negative eﬀort eﬀects of wage cuts are stronger when information about wages of
other, higher paid workers is provided.
The experimental sessions took place in February and April 2006 in the Cologne
Laboratory for Economic Research. We conducted four sessions, one for each cell of
our 2x2 design. Altogether 128 subjects participated, most of them with a major in
Economics, Business Administration or related ﬁelds.8 Subjects were recruited using
the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). In the invitation e-mail, the
experiment was announced as a ‘work experiment’, indicating that subjects were
recruited for a research-related real eﬀort task rather than a usual decision making
experiment. The computerized input mask used in the two real eﬀort tasks was
implemented utilizing the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). At the end of the
experiment, subjects ﬁlled in a post-experimental questionnaire. Each session lasted
(1999).
8Two out of 128 subjects had to be excluded from the data set: One person accidentally
received wrong instructions; the other person did not understand the compensation system in the
experiment. In the post-experimental questionnaire, the person stated that he realized not until
the course of the second task that piece-rates would be paid without controlling the correctness of
the working input.
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approximately one hour. Participants were paid out their accumulated earnings for
both tasks privately and left the laboratory. Piece-rate treatments were conducted
ﬁrst, where participants received 0.20 Euros per completed form in the ﬁrst task,
and 0.08/0.32 Euros in the second task. To ensure comparability of overall ﬁnancial
incentives, wages in the ﬁxed rate treatments were set equal to the average payoﬀ
in the piece-rate conditions. Speciﬁcally, ﬁxed wages were 6.80 Euros in the ﬁrst
task, and 2.70/10.90 Euros in the second task. The overall average payoﬀ was 16.10
Euros, including a show-up fee of 2.50 Euros.
4.4 Experimental Results
In the remainder of this paper, we use the following notations for our four experi-
mental treatment cells:
 VAR Public for piece-rate wages and public wage information,
 VAR Private for piece-rate wages and private wage information,
 FIX Public for ﬂat wages and public wage information, and
 FIX Private for ﬂat wages and private wage information.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the development of average output over 1-minute intervals
for both wage regimes, averaged over information and payment conditions. Exa-
mination immediately leads to a rejection of the minimal-eﬀort Null hypothesis and
conﬁrms hypothesis 1: participants invest considerable eﬀort and produce usable
output. Under both wage schemes, average performance increases throughout task
1, but shrinks again roughly in the second half of task 2.9 Hence, in our real eﬀort
experiment the implemented incentive schemes (ﬁxed wages and piece-rates) largely
yield identical output despite the diﬀerences in economic incentives for workers.
Table 4.1 lists mean and standard deviation values for the performance measures
of all our experimental groups. On average, subjects complete between some 26 and
35 forms in the ﬁrst task (between some 30 and 41 in the task 2).10 Despite large
9The reason for the decrease is not that the majority of subjects reached the threshold of 50
forms. In fact, only 15 out of 126 subjects completed all forms in the second task.
10It is is important to note that there is a strong variation between the subjects. The minimum
and maximum values of correct forms accounted for 0 and 42 forms in task 1 (2 and 45 forms in
task 2).
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Figure 4.1
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incentives to cheat, output and working quality are generally high. Over treatment
groups, the average share of correct questionnaires ranges between 66% and 88%.
Moreover, there is evidence that subjects become remarkably better in solving the
task, as average output increases in all experimental groups.11 This performance
increase is corroborated by non-parametric tests: comparing ﬁrst- and second-task
output on the individual level with two-sided Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Signed Ranks
(WMPSR) tests yields p-values of p <.001 in all experimental groups except low-paid
subjects in VAR Public.12
Learning eﬀects and the subsequent general increase in performance make a di-
rect analysis of behavior after the wage change diﬃcult, because skill diﬀerences
and the speed of learning might possibly overlay the direct eﬀects on motivation.
Therefore, as a ﬁrst step to isolate incentive eﬀects, we compare not the absolute,
but the relative performance increases. For all three performance measures we cal-
culate subjects’ individual performance changes in percent of their respective task
1 performance. Averages per treatment are depicted in Figure 4.2.
11In the post-experimental questionnaire, 66 out 126 subjects stated that their ability to ﬁll in
the values increased throughout the experiment.
12Comparing quantity and quality separately yields similar results. Whereas the increase in
quantity is signiﬁcant in 7 out of 8 treatment groups (p <.002, two-sided WMPSR tests), the
quality increase is signiﬁcant in 5 of those groups (p <.05, two-sided WMPSR tests).
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Table 4.1
Average Working Performance per Treatment
(a) Quantity Task 1 Task 2
N Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
VAR Public High 16 29.3 5.9 34.0 6.6
Low 16 33.5 8.9 41.3 9.4
VAR Private High 15 35.4 9.9 40.3 8.3
Low 15 26.7 8.4 31.5 9.9
FIX Public High 16 28.1 8.4 30.1 9.7
Low 16 28.4 7.6 31.8 9.2
FIX Private High 16 30.4 10.6 35.0 9.0
Low 16 29.1 9.4 33.3 9.6
(b) Quality Task 1 Task 2
N Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
VAR Public High 16 74.3 14.4 82.5 18.7
Low 16 75.3 13.2 69.5 17.5
VAR Private High 15 69.5 26.3 71.2 28.8
Low 15 67.5 19.8 74.9 23.4
FIX Public High 16 75.7 11.2 88.3 6.1
Low 16 74.6 9.4 79.5 16.0
FIX Private High 16 75.3 11.3 81.2 11.6
Low 16 77.1 10.5 81.3 10.2
(c) Output Task 1 Task 2
N Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
VAR Public High 16 22.2 7.4 28.3 8.5
Low 16 25.9 9.0 28.5 9.4
VAR Private High 15 23.4 10.6 27.8 12.4
Low 15 18.9 9.3 23.3 10.8
FIX Public High 16 21.6 7.9 26.6 8.6
Low 16 21.6 7.7 25.5 9.4
FIX Private High 16 23.4 9.9 28.6 8.6
Low 16 22.9 9.1 27.1 8.3
The ﬁrst thing to note is that there are no distinct diﬀerences between high wage
and low wage subjects under private information. Neither under piece-rates nor
under ﬁxed wages we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence if we compare the experimental
groups statistically using two-sided Mann-Whitney-U (MWU) tests (all p-values are
higher than p >.1).13 In particular, there is no evidence for hypotheses 2b and 2c
13P -values of all two-sided MWU tests can be found in Table 4.5 in the Appendix.
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Figure 4.2
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that (dis)advantaged subjects increase (lower) output subsequently or shift eﬀort
from quality to quantity.
Contrary, high and low wage workers adjust performance diﬀerently if they are
informed about co-worker wages under piece-rates. Here, low-wage subjects increase
quantity stronger than high-wage subjects (p = :060, two-sided MWU test) while
lacking behind with respect to quality increase (p = :019, two-sided MWU test). In
fact, the group of low-paid subjects in VAR Public is the only group in which average
quality becomes lower in the second task. This behavior is in line with incentives
58
for subjects in the inferior relative position and would also correspond to inequity
aversion: Increasing quantity enables low-paid subjects to mitigate their payment
disadvantage. As the working task requires substantial eﬀort and concentration,
this has a detrimental eﬀect on working quality. Thus, we can accept hypothesis 3a
in the sense that it is information about peer wages which eventually invokes the
reciprocal eﬀects expected in hypotheses 2b and 2c.
In the ﬁxed wage treatments, adjustments are strongly mitigated under public
information, which lets us statistically reject hypothesis 2a and any additional eﬀects
of peer wage information. Yet diﬀerences in relative performance changes between
high and low wage subjects have the same signs as in the piece-rate treatment: Low-
paid subjects increase quantity (quality) stronger (weaker) than high wage subjects.
However, under ﬁxed wages none of these diﬀerences is signiﬁcant at conventional
levels.
In our piece-rate scheme, subjects have the clear incentive to cheat by comple-
ting as much questionnaire forms as possible. The question is whether the wage
change and social information aﬀect shirking behavior systematically. To identify
such behavior, we distinguish between ‘regular’ errors and deliberate false entries to
increase quantity and payments. We classify all arbitrary entries (for example if only
0s were ﬁlled in) and deliberate omissions (for example if the participant did not ﬁll
in decimal places) as forms of shirking. All other incorrect forms are classiﬁed as
unsystematic errors.
Table 4.2
Percentage of Incorrectly Completed Forms by Source of Error
Shirking Unsystematic Errors
Task 1 Task 2 Task 1 Task 2
VAR Public High 4.5 6.1 19.9 10.8
Low 1.9 13.3 20.7 18.0
VAR Private High 21.3 20.7 15.4 12.4
Low 6.3 11.4 23.0 15.0
FIX Public High 5.1 2.9 18.4 8.9
Low 1.8 4.1 22.0 15.6
FIX Private High 2.1 4.5 20.8 13.9
Low 1.9 4.5 19.1 14.3
Table 4.2 displays the share of incorrect forms submitted for each treatment
group, distinguished per source of errors. While there is variation with respect to
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the level of cheating between the experimental groups in task 1, average behavior
of the subjects is roughly in line with incentives, as the level of shirking is higher
among groups under piece-rate compensation.14 Furthermore, the above-mentioned
learning eﬀects are displayed in the data because the share of unsystematic errors
decreases in all treatments in task 2. However, the experimental treatments diﬀer
with respect to the size of those adjustments.
First, increasing payments has no clear eﬀect on shirking, as adjustments are only
small in all experimental groups. Contrary, wage cuts result in increased shirking
under piece-rates as low-paid subjects increase cheating by some 11% (5%) in VAR
Public (VAR Private). Under ﬁxed wages, the eﬀects of wage cuts are negligible
which seems plausible because subjects cannot inﬂuence their payoﬀs by completing
more forms with false entries.
In line with the results on relative performance changes, we ﬁnd no systematic
diﬀerences between high- and low-wage subjects in the private information groups.
Comparing the number of incorrect forms on the individual level between treatments
with two-sided MWU tests yields p-values of p > :1.15
Contrary, the eﬀect of peer information becomes visible again. Under piece-
rates, the shares of mistakes due to shirking and due to lower accuracy are (weakly)
signiﬁcantly higher for low-paid subjects (p = :072 and p = :001, two-sided MWU
tests, respectively). The reason for this diﬀerence is that the relative share of shir-
king increases among low-paid subjects (p = :001, two-sided WMSPR test) whereas
accuracy of high-paid subjects becomes higher (p = :008, two-sided WMSPR test).
Thus, we ﬁnd behavioral eﬀects of the wage change in both directions: Whereas
the public wage cut increases some subjects’ willingness to deliberately choose ac-
tions that harm the principal, the wage increase obviously motivates the respective
workers to increase eﬀort into accuracy.
The latter eﬀect can be observed also in our treatments with ﬁxed wages. Under
public information, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the share of unsystematic
errors between high and low wage earners (p = :013, two-sided MWU test), because
the former increase the level of accuracy after the wage change (p < :001, two-sided
WMSPR test).
14Please note that the relatively high value for shirking in VAR Private High is mainly driven
by two subjects who entered only arbitrary values in both tasks.
15Table 4.6 in the Appendix displays the signiﬁcance levels of all applied two-sided MWU tests.
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Table 4.3
OLS Regressions of Individual
Performance in Task 2
Dependent Quantity Quality Output
Variable in Task 2 in Task 2 in Task 2
VAR Public High 7.815*** 0.241*** 8.222***
[1.795] [0.067] [1.776]
VAR Public Low 11.323*** 0.103 5.086***
[1.956] [0.067] [1.919]
VAR Private High 8.643*** 0.166** 6.677***
[2.052] [0.064] [1.852]
VAR Private Low 7.594*** 0.219*** 6.303***
[1.726] [0.063] [1.693]
FIX Public High 4.947*** 0.289*** 7.098***
[1.754] [0.068] [1.753]
FIX Public Low 6.348*** 0.209*** 5.979***
[1.763] [0.067] [1.755]
FIX Private High 7.808*** 0.221*** 7.406***
[1.837] [0.067] [1.822]
FIX Private Low 7.295*** 0.207*** 6.357***
[1.788] [0.069] [1.803]
Quantity Task 1 0.895***
[0.048]
Quality Task 1 0.785***
[0.078]
Output Task 1 0.903***
[0.054]
N 126 126 126
R-squared 0.99 0.98 0.97
Standard errors are given in brackets. ** and *** denote sig-
niﬁcance on the 5% and 1%-level, respectively.
So far, our analysis has not controlled for individual abilities. However, as the
experimental subjects are very heterogeneous with respect to performance, we have
to assure that our results about the eﬀects of social comparisons are robust against
the inclusion of measures for individual ability.
Table 4.3 lists simple linear regression models with measures for individual per-
formance in task 2 as dependent variable: quantity (model 1), quality (model 2), and
output (model 3). To control for diﬀerences in ability among subjects, we include
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performance in the task 1 as an independent variable. As expected, task 1 perfor-
mance is a strong and highly signiﬁcant predictor of performance in task 2 in all
speciﬁcations. Additionally, we include dummies for each experimental treatment
(the constant is suppressed). The dummy variables are all positive and signiﬁcant
in most cases. Therefore, to investigate if the strength of adjustments diﬀers among
the treatments, we compare the sizes of the regression coeﬃcients using Wald tests.
The resulting two-sided p-values are displayed in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4
P-values of Two-Sided Wald Tests on
Differences in Regression Coefficients
Tests on Quantity Quality Output
High versus low wages
VAR Public 0.032 0.003 0.095
VAR Private 0.540 0.272 0.846
FIX Public 0.383 0.087 0.546
FIX Private 0.750 0.766 0.572
Public versus private information
VAR High 0.617 0.113 0.670
VAR Low 0.027 0.016 0.527
FIX High 0.077 0.142 0.868
FIX Low 0.555 0.961 0.839
Note: Signiﬁcant or weakly signiﬁcant p-values are indicated
by bold numbers.
In line with our former statements, we ﬁnd no per se impact of wage changes,
irrespective of the compensation scheme. Estimated coeﬃcients for high wage and
low wage workers do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in any of the performance measures
when subjects are not informed about their relative standing. However, there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between treatments which allow for social comparisons. Under
piece-rates, low-paid subjects increase quantity stronger than high-paid subjects
(p = :032) and lack behind with respect to quality (p = :003) which leads to a
weakly signiﬁcant lower output eﬀect (p = :095). In addition, comparing low-paid
subjects with and without peer information under piece rates shows that the former
group increases quantity (quality) stronger (weaker) than the latter (p = :027 and
p = :016, respectively). Under ﬁxed wages those eﬀects are again mitigated. We
observe a weakly signiﬁcant diﬀerence between high-paid and low-paid subjects with
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respect to quality (p = :087), whereas there is no quantity or output eﬀect (p = :383
and p = :546, respectively).
Comparing high-paid subjects with and without information does not yield signi-
ﬁcant eﬀects, with the exception of the quantity eﬀect which is weakly signiﬁcantly
higher under ﬁxed wages and private information (p = :077). Hence, there is no
further evidence that information about the superior wage position triggers perfor-
mance increases.
4.5 Conclusions
We have conducted a real-eﬀort experiment in which subjects had to solve two simple
working tasks. After identical wages for the ﬁrst task, we introduce wage diﬀerentials
in the second task. Whereas subjects generally improve performance due to learning
processes, there are performance diﬀerences found if relative comparisons between
subjects are possible due to peer wage information.
Unlike related studies, wage changes per se do not lead to signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
performance adjustments among the subjects in our setting. Only if information
about peer wages is provided, performance changes of low- and high-paid workers
diﬀer from each other. This eﬀect is stronger under piece rates where subjects have
the chance to inﬂuence the distribution of absolute payoﬀs. Moreover, the result is
mainly driven by subjects in inferior positions who show an increased probability to
shirk although there is some evidence that high-wage workers increase their working
eﬀort displayed by lower error rates due to inaccuracy.
Responses to wage changes are generally weak under ﬂat wages. In particular,
there is no evidence for negative adjustments of low-paid workers under public in-
formation as observed under piece-rates. A possible reason for this observation in
our experiment could be income eﬀects: Low-paid workers were already guaranteed
a comparably high payoﬀ before task 2 started (12.00 Euros including show-up fee
for approximately one hour of presence in the laboratory) which is more than the
usual hourly wage for students. Thus, the fact that low-paid subjects under ﬁxed
wages did not decrease their eﬀort could be in line with the experimental results
of Greenberg (1987) suggesting that the perceived unfairness of lower relative pay-
oﬀs diminishes with rising absolute payoﬀs. Moreover, such behavior is consistent
with the model of reference-dependent preferences proposed by Köszegi and Rabin
(2006). Here, subjects are assumed to evaluate economic outcomes relative to a
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reference point based on rational expectations. In our environment, this would sug-
gest that subjects evaluate realized payments relative to expected payments. If in
our case subjects used an average hourly wage (which is also a common base for the
calculation of average participant payoﬀs in economic experiments) as the reference
income, the wage cut in task 2 would not be interpreted as a loss and subsequently
would not alter eﬀort decisions.16
An alternative explanation is related to the character of a ﬁxed wage contract.
Sliwka (2007) introduced a model in which the principal can signal her positive
expectation of employees’ cooperativeness by oﬀering a ﬂat wage rather than a
piece-rate wage contract. If a substantial share of employees orientate on behavior of
their peers and believe them to deliver decent work, this signal can induce high eﬀort
exertion. A similar mechanism could lead to a lower sensitivity of our experimental
subjects to the wage cut.17 Moreover, this would explain why aggregate quantity
and output in the ﬁxed wage treatment are not substantially lower than in the
piece-rate treatment.
Summarizing, our study provides new evidence that relative economic positions
matter for eﬀort and performance in working environments. However, it also shows
that the impact of relative wages might depend on the form of compensation. For
the design of incentive schemes it would be therefore important to gain further
insights into this motivational interaction. While the research on social preferences
and incentives has been very active in the last years, there is still a large potential for
studies about the design of mechanisms that create incentives but do not discourage
those who do not proﬁt from the system.
16Naturally, a similar argument applies also to subjects under piece rate wages. The diﬀerence
here is, however, that participants had the possibility to decrease the diﬀerence between expected
and realized income by ﬁlling in more forms.
17However, the model diﬀers to our setting in the sense that there is only one observable dimen-
sion of performance that the principal can fully control by setting piece-rates.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Instructions
Below we show the instructions translated from German for the ﬁrst and second task
in treatment VAR Public (High-wage workers). Instructions for the other treatments
were formulated in a similar way.
Instructions for task 1
Welcome! You can earn money in this experiment during the next hour. From
now on, please do not communicate with the other participants. If you have a
question about the experiment, please raise your hand! We will come over to you to
answer your question. If you break this rule, we will have to exclude you from the
experiment and all payments.
You will receive two working tasks today. The wages for both tasks will be paid out
at the end of the experiment.
All subjects were assigned either to group A or to group B. The group assignment
remains constant in both tasks. You belong to group A. One participant of group
B will be assigned to you.
The following instructions refer to the ﬁrst task. You will receive the instructions
for the second task after the ﬁrst task is over.
Task 1
You ﬁnd a staple with copies of questionnaires on the desk in front of you. These
questionnaires were ﬁlled in by the participants in a recent class-room experiment.
The data from the questionnaires are required in electronic form for analysis at our
institute. Your task is to ﬁll in the data into the input mask on your screen. The
data will be written automatically into an Excel-spreadsheet.
The participants in the classroom experiment had to answer 15 questions. These
questions were labeled 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 1.o, 1.u, 2.o, 2.u, 3.o, 3.u, 4.o, 4.u, 5.o and 5.u.
For each question, the participants had to give estimates in percent. The following
screen-shot shows the input mask for the data entry.
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Figure 4.3
Input Mask
First, please copy the number on the upper right side on each questionnaire and
write it into the ﬁeld ‘Number’ on the screen. Then, ﬁll in only the left column
of the percentage values from the questionnaires, i.e. the numbers for the categories
‘up‘ and ‘left‘, into the corresponding ﬁelds on the screen. You do not need to ﬁll in
the %-sign. Please note that you cannot ﬁll in commas into the ﬁelds on the screen.
Instead, you have to use decimal points according to the English syntax. After you
have ﬁlled in the values, press the OK-button. The data is then transferred and
written into the Excel-spreadsheet. Then go on with the next questionnaire.
You have 20 minutes time for the data input. The remaining time is displayed on
the screen. You receive an amount of 0.20 Euro for each questionnaire completely
ﬁlled in in task 1.
The participant of group B assigned to you works on the same set of questionnaires
as you do, and receives the same amount of 0.20 Euro for each questionnaire com-
pletely ﬁlled in. During later data validation entries are compared and, if necessary,
corrected.
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Instructions for task 2
Task 2
For task 2 you receive a new staple of questionnaires. These questionnaires contain
data of other participants from the same classroom experiment. These data are also
to be transferred in the same way as in task 1. Again, you have 20 minutes time for
the data input.
You receive an amount of 0.32 Euro for each completely ﬁlled in questionnaire in
task 2.
The same participant of group B as in task 1 is assigned to you and works again on
the same questionnaires as you. The participant of group B receives an amount of
0.08 Euro for each questionnaire completely ﬁlled in in task 2.
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4.6.2 Additional Test Statistics
Table 4.5
P-values of Two-Sided Mann-Whitney-U
Tests on Differences in Relative
Performance Increases between Treatments
Quantity Quality Output
Increase Increase Increase
High versus low wages
VAR Public 0.060 0.019 0.171
VAR Private 0.560 0.102 0.137
FIX Public 0.933 0.224 0.283
FIX Private 0.450 0.485 0.462
Public versus private information
VAR High 0.822 0.208 0.236
VAR Low 0.172 0.008 0.113
FIX High 0.365 0.146 0.609
FIX Low 0.462 0.361 0.963
Signiﬁcant and weakly signiﬁcant p-values are indicated by bold
numbers.
Table 4.6
P-values of Two-Sided Mann-Whitney-U Tests on
Differences in Sources of Errors between
Treatments
Shirking Unsystematic Errors
Task 1 Task 2 Task 1 Task 2
High versus low wages
VAR Public 0.333 0.072 0.105 0.001
VAR Private 0.360 0.267 0.325 0.967
FIX Public 0.615 0.608 0.080 0.013
FIX Private 0.749 0.612 0.266 0.955
Public versus private information
VAR High 0.451 0.172 0.689 0.562
VAR Low 0.501 0.176 0.338 0.015
FIX High 0.708 0.129 0.099 0.014
FIX Low 0.863 0.179 0.206 0.970
Signiﬁcant and weakly signiﬁcant p-values are indicated by bold numbers.
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Chapter 5
The Dynamics of Cooperation in a
Microﬁnance Game
5.1 Introduction
Developed in the 1970s to alleviate poverty in the lowest-income countries, microﬁ-
nance programs are now widespread and have also entered the western world. The
non-proﬁt organization MIX Market reports that in 2007, 890 surveyed microﬁ-
nance institutions (MFI) served more than 30.1 million borrowers and managed a
loan portfolio of more than 64 billions USD (see the MicroBanking Bulletin, 2008).
The goal of microﬁnance lending is to provide poor population groups the access
to credit markets that would otherwise be blocked due to prohibitively high risks and
transaction costs. Most MFI rely on non-standard contract schemes and practices,
the most prominent being group responsibility or joint liability lending. Here, several
borrowers form groups that are jointly responsible for the payback of the entire credit
sum. If one borrower is not able to repay her credit, the other group members have
to bail her out.
Joint liability contracts beneﬁt both clients and MFI. First, they oﬀer a ‘social’
collateral for borrowers who are not able to provide tangible assets. Second, moral
hazard and adverse selection problems between MFI and borrowers are mitigated
because costly screening or monitoring activities are carried out by the group.1
1Stiglitz (1990), Banerjee et al. (1994), and Armendàriz de Aghion (1999) show how monitoring
and sanctioning among agents in a borrower group can mitigate moral hazard problems with respect
to project choices. Furthermore, the formation of borrower into credit groups helps to overcome
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Indeed, repayment rates in joint liability microﬁnance programs are usually very
high given the large share of households subject to extremely high economic risks
in the portfolios of MFI.
However, various factors can limit the functionality of joint liability lending. First
of all, moral hazard problems may be created within a borrower group. If the
responsibility for repayment is borne by the group, borrowers have the incentive
to free-ride by shifting the repayment burden or investment risks to fellow group
members. Therefore, if monitoring is incomplete – for example because social ties
between group members are loose or non-existent – or if social sanctioning within
groups is not possible, joint liability schemes may not function in the desired way.
Moreover, the threat of moral hazard within groups may aﬀect the composition of
an institution’s credit portfolio, as joint liability programs become less attractive for
good risks.2
In practice, several large MFI have refrained from group responsibility contracts
or have started to oﬀer individual liability contracts to their clients. However, there
is little empirical evidence that helps to evaluate in which circumstances which
contract scheme is preferable. Giné and Karlan (2007) state that, “despite being
a question of ﬁrst-order importance, empirical research on group versus individual
liability lending has not provided policymakers and institutions the clean evidence
needed to determine the relative merits of the two methodologies.”
One inherent problem of empirical studies about the impact of contract schemes
is identiﬁcation, because most MFI initially oﬀer one type of contract, and esti-
mated eﬀects might potentially suﬀer for example from selection biases. Therefore,
the goal of the present study is to complement existing empirical work by investigat-
ing behavior under joint and individual liability contracts in a controlled laboratory
environment. In particular, the focus is on the dynamics of behavior, because the
interaction among group members might crucially inﬂuence the functioning of con-
tract schemes over time. So far, the evolution of interaction between borrowers
under group lending has received relatively little attention. Moreover, we consider
the mentioned case where no mechanism such as social sanctioning is available to
adverse selection problems (see Armendàriz de Aghion and Gollier, 2000, Ghatak, 1999 and van
Tassel, 1999). Finally, peer pressure within borrower groups might reduce strategic defaults (see
Besley and Coate, 1995). For an overview of the theoretical literature see Morduch (1999).
2Other potential disadvantages of joint liability are related to the evolution of credit demand. If
group members are heterogeneous concerning the required amounts of funding, individual contracts
may become optimal for the wealthier clients, see Madajewicz (2004).
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directly enforce cooperative behavior. Finally, the study compares the performance
of diﬀerent conversion mechanisms in mitigating moral hazard problems among bor-
rowers.
We let experimental subjects play a microﬁnance game repeatedly under joint
liability (run 1) before partly being converted into individual liability (run 2). Sub-
jects decide about the eﬀort invested into a risky project for up to 12 periods in each
run. Under joint liability, subjects face a dilemma situation, as minimum eﬀort is
the individually optimal choice while the maximum feasible eﬀort maximizes joint
payoﬀs. Furthermore, in line with common practice of MFI, we introduce dynamic
incentives. Irrespective of liability schemes, credit provision in a given period is
contingent on successful repayment in the previous period.3
Two conversion mechanisms from joint to individual liability are implemented.
In a ﬁrst treatment, subjects can choose between an individual and a joint liabi-
lity contract after the ﬁrst run of the experiment. In a second treatment, borrower
groups with above-average repayment performance are subsequently oﬀered indivi-
dual contracts for run 2 while the other subjects remain under joint liability. Finally,
we compare the performance of these mechanisms with a baseline setup in which
subjects remain under joint liability for both runs of the game.
Despite the absence of direct sanctioning mechanisms, average eﬀort levels remain
high until the end of the game in all experimental treatments. Nevertheless, within-
group moral hazard is still observable, as subjects converted into individual liability
increase their eﬀort signiﬁcantly relative to the ﬁrst run.
Moreover, individual eﬀort decisions are positively related to partner eﬀort and
negatively related to the frequency of partner repayments. Thus, the results suggest
a path dependency of behavior that may have a detrimental eﬀect for the functioning
of joint liability programs from a dynamic perspective.
In line with eﬀort decisions, subjects become more likely to select individual
contracts the lower the partner eﬀort and the higher the frequency of partner repay-
ments were. Regardless of this pattern, average eﬀort provided by subjects opting
for a joint liability contract persists on a high level in run 2. Contrary, in the treat-
ment with performance based conversion, average eﬀort levels among the subjects
remaining under group lending tend to be lower than in the baseline treatment.
3Armendàriz de Aghion and Morduch (2000) and (2005) show formally that the threat of not
receiving follow-up loans may prevent strategic default of borrowers.
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In the following, we brieﬂy review the relevant empirical and experimental
literature (section 5.2). In the next step, we introduce our experimental decision
situation (section 5.3), describe the experimental details and formulate hypotheses
(section 5.4). We present aggregate and individual results in section 5.5. Finally,
section 5.6 gives a short conclusion.
5.2 Related Literature
Experimental and empirical studies about the behavioral impacts of microﬁnance
contracts are scarce up to now and yield mixed results. In a laboratory experiment
where subjects had the option to default strategically, Abbink et al. (2006a) found
that repayment performance increased under joint liability relative to individual
liability. Giné et al. (2009) conducted experiments in urban Peru with a large
sample of owners and employees of micro-enterprizes. Among other things, the
authors found that the introduction of joint liability lending increased the riskiness of
project choices in a dynamical setting. Kono (2006) reported results of experiments
in three districts of Ho-Chi-Minh City showing that strategic default increased if
subjects were jointly responsible for repayment.4
There are few studies investigating empirically the eﬀects of contract schemes
and conversion into individual liability. Giné and Karlan (2007) carried out a ﬁeld
experiment in which a random sample of joint liability borrowers was converted into
individual liability. The authors found no diﬀerence in repayment performance be-
tween the contractual schemes after the conversion. However, the data conﬁrmed
some inherent problems of joint liability lending, as individual liability programs
were more likely to attract new customers. Cull et al. (2009) compared the perfor-
mance of microﬁnance institutions and found no large diﬀerences in loan portfolio
quality with respect to the implemented contract schemes. Finally, in a survey study
conducted in cooperation with the group lending organization FINCA-Peru, Kar-
lan (2007) showed that repayment performance of borrower groups increased with
stronger social ties between the members.
Ahlin and Townsend (2007) report evidence from a rural microﬁnance institution
4Other microﬁnance experiments include the studies by Abbink et al. (2006b) analyzing the
role of interest rates for repayment performance and Karlan (2005) connecting individual choices
in trust and public goods games to performance in microﬁnance programs. Here, a positive relation
between trustworthiness in investment games and repayment and savings behavior is established.
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in Thailand that leaves clients the decision about the form of liability. The authors
found evidence for adverse selection among borrowers, as the selection into joint
liability contracts and the probability of a household’s project success were nega-
tively correlated. In a study of microﬁnance loans in Canada, Gomez and Santor
(2003) found superior repayment performance of group lending schemes due to both
selection eﬀects and decreasing moral hazard problems within groups.
As moral hazard within borrower groups is modeled as a social dilemma in the
present study, evidence from public goods games is also highly relevant. In this ex-
tensively studied experimental game, positive cooperation levels among participants
are usually observed, and this eﬀect becomes stronger for partner matchings (for an
extensive survey of the related literature see Ledyard, 1995). Furthermore, for our
treatment in which subjects can choose between individual and joint liability, the
results of experiments investigating the eﬀect of selection processes are particular
important. These studies show that self-selection of participants into groups can
foster social norms of cooperation and may help to mitigate or eliminate dilemma
problems (see Bohnet and Kübler, 2005, Page et al., 2005, Gürerk et al., 2006 and
Grimm and Mengel, 2009). Out-of-equilibrium payoﬀs or sanctioning possibilities
may lead to a self-selection of subjects into highly-cooperative groups and in most
cases to perpetuation of high cooperation levels. For our setting, these results would
suggest that the selection into joint liability could be a signal for the willingness to
cooperate.5
5At the same time, positive expectations about peer cooperation can make it optimal for selﬁsh
subjects to enter joint liability and exploit the fellow group members by not providing eﬀort.
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5.3 Decision Situation and Experimental
Parameters
In our experimental setting, we model the decision situation of borrowers after being
granted a credit amount of I by a bank or MFI. In every period in which a credit
has been provided, events unfold as follows:
1. Each credit is automatically invested into a risky project that pays R > 0 in
case of success and 0 in case of failure.
2. Every borrower chooses the eﬀort level e invested into the project from the
interval [e0; emax]. Eﬀort exertion positively inﬂuences the probability p of
project success according to the function p(e). Eﬀort costs are captured by the
cost function c(e) and have to be incurred irrespective of the project outcome.
3. Project payoﬀs are determined. In case of joint liability, payoﬀs and eﬀort
levels of all borrowers are public information, but there is no possibility of
sanctioning. Loan repayments L for each credit are automatically deducted
from borrowers’ payoﬀs in case of suﬃcient funds. If the credit is fully re-
paid, a new credit is provided in the next period and the decision situation
starts again. Contrary, if borrowers default, they receive no further credit in
subsequent periods.
We pose a number of restrictions on the variables. First, a borrower is able to
repay two loans in case of success under joint liability, because R  2L.6 Next,
there is an exogenous success probability p0 > 0 regardless of eﬀort provision so
that total success probability p accounts for p = p0 + p(e). Moreover, we assume a
constant marginal success probability p0(e) = p and constant marginal eﬀort costs
c0(e) = c. Hence, every unit of eﬀort increases the probability of project success by
a ﬁxed factor and is associated with constant additional eﬀort costs. Finally, we
assume that providing the maximum feasible eﬀort still bears a risk of failure, as
p(e0) + p(emax) < 1.
6This assumption is necessary to avoid non-linearities of proﬁt functions under joint liability
contracts.
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In the individual liability case a borrower’s expected payoﬀ (or utility under risk-
neutrality) is
E[i(e)] = [p0 + pi(ei)]  (R  L)  c(ei) (5.1)
The ﬁrst-order-condition (FOC) for the optimal eﬀort level yields p0 (R L) = c0.
As p0(e) = p and c0(e) = c, only corner solutions are possible: depending on the
relative size of marginal gains and marginal costs of eﬀort provision, it is either
optimal to choose the maximum eﬀort level emax or the minimum e0 in a one-shot
game.
We compare individual loan contracts to joint liability. In our simple case, we
assume that two persons form a borrower pair and are jointly responsible for the
repayment of the loan sum 2L. As the partners have to bail out each other, the
expected payoﬀ of borrower i now accounts for:7
E[i(ei; ej)] = [p0 + pi(ei)]  [p0 + pj(ej)]  (R  L)+
[p0 + pi(ei)]  [1  p0   pj(ej)]  (R  2L)  c(ei) (5.2)
With probability [p0 + pi(e)]  [p0 + pj(e)], both partners succeed and repay their
own loans. However, with probability [p0+pi(e)][1 p0 pj(ej)] borrower i’s project
succeeds while partner j’s project fails. In that case, the payoﬀ of the successful
borrower is reduced also by the other group member’s obligation. For borrower i’s
FOC follows p0  [p0+pj(ej)]  (R L)+p0  [1 p0 pj(ej)]  (R 2L) = c0. Replacing
p0 = p and c0 = c and rearranging, we get p  [R  L  (1  p0   pj(ej))  L] ? c.
Comparing ﬁrst-order conditions under individual and joint liability shows the
moral hazard problem among borrowers in the latter contract. As the term 1 p0 
pj(ej) is greater than zero per assumption, the provision of emax becomes less likely
under group lending. This is because the possibility that a borrower has to stand
in for her partner makes own project success and eﬀort exertion less attractive than
in the individual case.8
7Success probabilities and project payoﬀs of the two borrowers are independent.
8Please note that the decision situation would be analogous if social sanctions existed but were
not carried out in a group despite the possibility to observe the partner’s eﬀort. Armendàriz de
Aghion and Morduch (2005) mention kinship among villagers or anonymous credit programs in
cities as examples for situations in which social interaction between members of borrower groups
might not be eﬀective.
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Optimal eﬀort decisions in this setting depend on the precise set of parameters.
Hence, we have to pose a number of restrictions to model the situation in the desired
way.
First, it should be individually optimal to choose e = e0 under both contracts
in the one-shot game. This restriction depicts the inherent moral hazard problem
between MFI and borrower. Next, the borrower group should face a social dilemma.
It follows that the maximum sum of payoﬀs for the borrowers is reached if both
borrowers exert e = emax. For success probabilities p0 and p(emax), this is true as long
as eﬀort is not too costly: c  emax  [p(emax)  p0] R  [p(emax)  (2  p(emax)) 
p0  (2  p0)]  L.9
Additional requirements have to be met in the repeated setting. The ﬁrst re-
quirement is related to individual liability contracts and the functioning of dynamic
incentives: the threat of not receiving follow-up loans must provide a disciplining
eﬀect on agents’ eﬀort choices. Therefore, we assume that full eﬀort exertion is
optimal for the individual borrower i in the repeated setting, so that the following
condition for expected payoﬀs holds: E[i(ei;t = emax)] > E[i(ei;t = e0)] 8t.
Furthermore, parameters should ensure that while the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the game consists of both borrowers choosing e = e0 in each period,
the choice that maximizes joint payoﬀs is full eﬀort exertion. Therefore, E[i(ei;t =
emaxjej;t = emax)]  E[i(ei;t = e0jej;t = e0)] 8t.10
Finally, the insurance eﬀect of joint liability lending has to be captured by
E[i;JL(ei;t = emaxjej;t = emax)] > E[i;IL(ei;t = emax)] > E[i;JL(ei;t = e0j
ej;t = e0)] 8t. Here, E[i;JL] and E[i;JL] denominate expected payoﬀs for borrower
i in the repeated game under group and individual lending, respectively. According
to this condition, expected payoﬀs from the full eﬀort strategy under joint liability
exceed maximum payoﬀs under individual contracts. However, individual contracts
have to be superior in payoﬀs compared to a joint liability setting in which both
players choose e = e0 in every period. This refers to the argument that borrowers
9Eﬀort costs have to be lower than the expected gain for the borrower from switching to high
eﬀort. The term [p(emax) p0]R displays the expected increase in project revenue. However, higher
eﬀort increases also the probability that the credit has to be repaid. Therefore, expected gains have
to be corrected for the expected increase in loan repayments [p(emax)(2 p(emax)) p0 (2 p0)]L:
This term is always positive as long as p(emax) > p0.
10We also show in the Appendix that the full eﬀort strategy ei;t = ej;t = emax8t yields higher ex-
pected payoﬀs than an alternating eﬀort strategy in which group members chose in turn maximum
and minimum eﬀort levels.
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are made worse oﬀ if low cooperation is established in the groups.
Table 5.1
Parameter Set
Variable Parameter Value
R 200
L 100
I 50
e0 0
emax 8
p0 0.5
p(e) 0:05  e
c(e) 6  e
The parameters listed in table 5.1 meet the described conditions (for a more de-
tailed proof of all described parameter restrictions see section 5.7.2 in the Appendix.)
5.4 Experimental Design and Hypotheses
We conducted 8 experimental sessions in which altogether 256 subjects took part
(32 subjects per session), most of them with a major in Economics, Business Admin-
istration or related ﬁelds. In each session, participants were divided into matching
groups of 8 persons (subjects were not aware of this procedure). The experiment
consisted of two runs of up to 12 rounds of the described decision situation.
Subjects started run 1 under joint liability. Before the ﬁrst period began, every
person was randomly assigned an anonymous partner from her matching group with
whom she formed a borrower pair for the entire ﬁrst run. In the ﬁrst period, both
partners simultaneously decided about eﬀort levels. As long the sum of loan repay-
ments was covered in a given period, the borrower pair received two new loans in the
subsequent period and decided again about eﬀort levels. After each period, subjects
were informed about eﬀort levels and project revenues of both group members.
The treatment variation consisted of diﬀerent conversion mechanisms from joint
into individual liability that took place after run 1 was completed. We conducted
four treatments denoted with SELECT, PERFORM (divided into treatments
NOINFO and INFO) and BASE in the remainder of the paper. Our matching
procedure yields 8 statistically independent observations for each treatment.
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First, in treatment SELECT subjects could choose the contract in the second run.
After the ﬁrst 12 periods, people were handed instructions describing individual and
joint liability contracts and were asked to choose one contract that would be applied
for the next 12 periods. Subjects who had chosen joint liability contracts were paired
with a new partner from their experimental matching group.11
Second, borrower pairs were converted into individual liability on the basis of
repayment performance in the ﬁrst run (treatment PERFORM). The two pairs per
matching group with the highest repayment performance (i.e. the highest number
of successfully repaid loans) were converted into individual liability, while the other
two pairs remained in joint liability and were rematched with a new partner in
run 2.12 We conducted two speciﬁcations of this treatment: ﬁrst, treatment INFO
where subjects were informed about the conversion mechanism before the experiment
started and second, NOINFO, in which the information was provided after run 1.
Finally, treatment BASE served as the benchmark to control for dynamic eﬀects
of repeated interaction in the borrower groups. Here, all subjects played the decision
situation under joint liability in both runs. Similar to the other treatments, subjects
were rematched after the ﬁrst run.
Over the periods in which they received loans, subjects accumulated experimental
payoﬀs. If period losses occurred, for example if a project failed and the subject
had exerted positive eﬀort levels, these losses were subtracted from accumulated
payoﬀs. After the experiment, one run was randomly determined by the role of a
die. Accumulated payoﬀs of this run were subsequently converted into Euro and
paid out to the participants.
First of all, our focus is on the dynamics of moral hazard among the borrowers.
In line with evidence from public goods games, we expect positive average eﬀort
levels. However, we hypothesize that moral hazard problems are still persistent
and average eﬀort deteriorates over time (hypothesis 1a). As a further indication
for within-group moral hazard, we expect that eﬀort levels of subjects receiving
individual contracts increase relative to the ﬁrst run (hypothesis 1b).
The aim of our treatment variations is to investigate if and how conversion mech-
anisms inﬂuence eﬀort exertion and repayment performance. Both selection based
11If an uneven number of subjects per matching group had opted for joint liability, one person
was randomly chosen and converted into individual liability.
12If two or more pairs had the same repayment performance and this was relevant for the
assignment to contract schemes in the second run, one pair was randomly chosen for conversion.
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and performance based conversion do not change incentives to exert minimum eﬀort.
However, the question is if behavioral adaptations of the subjects to the mechanisms
have systematic eﬀects on cooperation under group lending.
In line with the relevant studies about selection in public goods games, we hy-
pothesize that self-selection into joint liability contracts induces higher cooperation
levels among borrower pairs in the second run (hypothesis 2).13
Under performance based conversion, we expect lower eﬀort exertion among the
remaining borrower pairs in the second run of the game (hypothesis 3). If there is
a correlation between repayment performance and eﬀort exertion, the willingness to
cooperate should be lower among borrower pairs in the second run, because subjects
know that they are matched with a partner who chose relatively low eﬀort levels in
the ﬁrst part of the experiment.14
Finally, as the joint liability oﬀers an insurance device against involuntary default,
it is important to note that risk preferences of the subjects might also inﬂuence both
the eﬀort levels and the contract choice. We will come back to this issue in the next
section.
The experimental sessions took place in the period from April 2008 to February
2009 in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research. Subjects were recruited
using Greiner’s Online Recruitment System (Greiner, 2004). The experiment was
computerized using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). After subjects arrived
and were randomly assigned to a cubicle, instructions were distributed.15 Ques-
13This eﬀect hinges on the assumption that players with a higher willingness to cooperate choose
the group contract. For this choice, expectations about partner eﬀorts play a central role. Under
strict rationality, each subject would expect minimum eﬀort exertion of the group member. Subse-
quently, expected payoﬀs are maximized by choosing individual liability and providing ei;t = emax
in each period. However, if a subject expects higher-than-minimum eﬀort levels ej;t from her part-
ner, it may become optimal to opt for joint liability if the expected eﬀort level is high enough.
With the present parametrization, expected partner eﬀort has to take values of ej;t  7 to make
the choice of joint liability proﬁtable (see 4. in the Appendix).
14In addition to behavioral changes in run 2, ex-ante information about performance related
conversion might inﬂuence behavior already in the ﬁrst run of the experiment (speciﬁcation INFO
in the PERFORM treatment). However, the provision of information has ambiguous eﬀects in
our setting. First, it could play a disciplining role for eﬀort exertion, as potential gains from
individual liability in the second run are high enough to compensate for the provision of non-
minimum eﬀort levels and losses from repayments of the partner’s loans in run 1. On the other
hand, presenting both contract schemes could lead to a higher saliency of incentive problems
among the borrowers and subsequently to lower eﬀorts. Please note also that in the SELECT
treatment, ex-ante information about conversion would not alter eﬀort decisions, as subjects have
the possibility of opting for the loan contract.
15Instructions translated from German can be found in the Appendix.
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tions were answered privately. Before payoﬀs were paid out, subjects ﬁlled out
a post-experimental questionnaire. They were asked about demographical data,
the underlying motivations for their decisions and in some sessions expectations
about average behavior of the participants. Subjects were privately paid out their
earnings for the selected run and left the laboratory. The average payoﬀ was 14.79
Euros (including an increased show-up fee of 5.00 Euros to cover potential losses in
the course of the game). Each session lasted approximately one and a half hours.
5.5 Experimental Results
In the following, we will present results on the aggregate level and compare the
experimental treatments with respect to eﬀort exertion and repayment performance.
In the next step, we will analyze inﬂuence factors on individual behavior. Finally, we
will brieﬂy investigate motivations for contract choices in the SELECT treatment.
5.5.1 Aggregate Results
Table 5.2 lists average eﬀort levels calculated over all active borrower pairs in both
runs for each experimental treatment.
Table 5.2
Average Effort Levels per Treatment and Run
Run 1 Run 2
Treatment Joint Liability Individual Liability Joint Liability
SELECT 5.89 7.27 6.28
NOINFO 5.70 7.09 6.00
INFO 5.53 6.82 5.30
BASE 6.04 – 6.37
The ﬁrst thing to notice is that high levels of cooperation are achieved in run
1, as average eﬀort levels account for 69 to 75% of the maximum feasible eﬀort.
Furthermore, non-parametric tests reveal that experimental treatments do not diﬀer
from each other with respect to eﬀort levels or repayment performance (two-sided
Mann-Whitney-U (MWU) tests comparing matching group averages yield p > :1).
For the further analysis, we pool the data of NOINFO and INFO in treatment
PERFORM. Although average eﬀort levels are somewhat lower in INFO, the dif-
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ference is not signiﬁcant at conventional levels.16 Hence, ex-ante information about
the conversion mechanism do not seem to alter behavior compared to the other
treatments.
The development of average eﬀort levels for all active borrowers is depicted in
ﬁgures 5.1 to 5.3. First, ﬁgure 5.1 shows that eﬀort levels underly a small downward
trend over time, but still account for more than 50% of the maximum level in the
ﬁnal period.
Figure 5.1
Average Effort Run 1 per Treatment
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In line with incentives, subjects converted to individual liability in run 2 converge
to full eﬀort exertion in the repeated game (see ﬁgure 5.2). Here, average eﬀort
levels for the second run increase to 87% (PERFORM) and 91% (SELECT) of
the maximum feasible level. This increase is corroborated by non-parametric tests:
subjects converted to individual contracts exhibit signiﬁcantly higher eﬀort levels
compared to run 1 (p = :016 for SELECT and p < :001 for PERFORM, two-sided
Wilcoxon-Matched-Pairs-Signed-Ranks (WMPSR) tests). Hence, we ﬁnd evidence
for the hypothesized within-group moral hazard under group lending.
16The p-values of two-sided MWU tests for eﬀort comparisons between NOINFO and INFO
yield p = :721 (run 1), p = :458 (run 2, individual liability) and p = :368 (run 2, joint liability).
Furthermore, comparing NOINFO and INFO pairwise with the other treatments yields p > :1 in
all cases.
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Figure 5.2
Average Effort Run 2 per Treatment (Individual Liability)
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Next, the dynamics of eﬀort exertion for joint liability pairs in the second run
are plotted in ﬁgure 5.3. Eﬀort levels remain on roughly the same level as in run 1.
While there is a small increase of average eﬀort in all treatments, this diﬀerence is
weakly signiﬁcant only in the BASE speciﬁcation (p = :078 for BASE, p = :844 for
SELECT and p = :706 for PERFORM, respectively, two-sided WMPSR tests).
Comparing eﬀort levels between the treatments, we ﬁnd no diﬀerence between
treatments BASE and SELECT (p = :574, two-sided MWU test). Thus, there is no
evidence in line with hypothesis 2 that selection into group contracts systematically
increases cooperation among the borrowers.
Subjects in treatment PERFORM provide lower average eﬀort levels than their
counterparts in the BASE treatment which corroborates hypothesis 3. Given that
subjects are informed about the conversion mechanism, this result seems plausible.
The prospect of being matched with a fellow borrower who had a low repayment
performance in the previous run might decrease own willingness to cooperate by
choosing high eﬀort levels. However, the eﬀect is only weakly signiﬁcant (p = :068,
two-sided MWU test).
Finally, to measure repayment performance, we use relative repayment rates
which we deﬁne as the percentage share of loans repaid at total feasible loans per
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Figure 5.3
Average Effort Run 2 per Treatment (Joint Liability)
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run. Table 5.3 lists relative repayment rates in all treatments for both runs.
Table 5.3
Relative Repayment Rates per Treatment and Run in %
Treatment Run 1 Run 2
Joint Liability Individual Liability Joint Liability
SELECT 83.3 47.8 77.9
PERFORM 81.3 45.1 71.6
BASE 78.1 – 71.4
There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences concerning repayment performance found be-
tween the three treatments (all tests yield p-values > :1 irrespective of the run).17
Relative repayment rates on average decrease in run 2, but only signiﬁcantly so
among subjects under individual liability (p = :008 for SELECT and p < :001
for PERFORM, two-sided WMPSR tests). Although subjects increase the eﬀort in-
vested into their projects, their vulnerability against unintentional default increases.
17In general, our experimental data conﬁrms that in treatment PERFORM, repayment per-
formance on average is valid signal for exerted eﬀort. Calculated over the whole ﬁrst run, the
correlation between repayment success and average eﬀort levels is positive and highly signiﬁcant
(Spearman’s  = :253, p = :001).
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Hence, the conversion of subjects do not pay oﬀ from a bank’s perspective in our
setting. The reason is that cooperation levels in the ﬁrst run are so high that the
insurance eﬀect of joint liability contracts dominates the moral hazard eﬀect.
5.5.2 Individual Decisions
To identify the drivers of individual behavior under joint liability, we calculate re-
gression models with random eﬀects on the level of the particular subject. Our
dependent variable is the individual eﬀort choice in a given period. As a robustness
check, we calculate all models also with OLS and robust standard errors for each
subject. Table 5.4 contrasts random eﬀects (RE) and OLS-models.18
In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation (model 1) for run 1, we include the variables Period
(number of period in respective run) and ej;t 1 (last period eﬀort level of the part-
ner) in the model. The coeﬃcient for Period is negative and signiﬁcant in both
speciﬁcations indicating a downward trend of eﬀort over time. More important, we
ﬁnd evidence for responsiveness of the subjects concerning partner eﬀort, as the sign
of ej;t 1 is positive and highly signiﬁcant. Thus, cooperation in the group lending
scheme is path-dependent: The lower the partner’s eﬀort in the previous period, the
lower is the eﬀort choice of a subject in a given period. It follows that in a dynamic
setting, the moral hazard problem of joint liability lending may increase over time.19
In speciﬁcation 2, we additionally include the variable TimesPaidt 1 indicating
the accumulated number of periods in which a subject had to repay the loan of
her partner. Due to the correlation to the eﬀort level ej;t 1, we also include the
interaction term ej;t 1 X TimesPaidt 1.20 Model 2 shows that – controlling for the
partner’s eﬀort level – a subject’s willingness to exert eﬀort declines signiﬁcantly
the more often she had to stand in for the partner’s loan. As the interaction term
is positive and signiﬁcant, the negative eﬀect of TimesPaidt 1 becomes smaller
with higher levels of partner eﬀort. Yet its estimated net eﬀect remains negative if
18Please note that conclusions remain similar if models with ﬁxed eﬀects per subjects are used.
19The dependency of eﬀort choices on partner decisions is already indicated by simple correlation
analysis. Under the joint liability contract, the Spearman -values between the eﬀort choice of a
person and her partner’s eﬀort choice in a given period of run 1 (run 2) account for .573 (.348)
in case of treatment SELECT, .549 (.424) in treatment PERFORM and .471 (.524) in treatment
BASE, respectively. All -values are highly signiﬁcant (p < :001 in all cases).
20There is a signiﬁcantly negative correlation between TimesPaidt 1 and ej;t 1 found in both
runs: Spearman -values calculated over all treatments account for  =  :188 in run 1 (p < :001)
and  =  :186 in run 2 (p < :001).
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Table 5.4
Determinants of Effort Choices under Joint Liability
No. 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b
Dependent ei;t ei;t ei;t ei;t ei;t ei;t
Variable
Run 1 Run 1 Run 1 Run 1 Run 2 Run 2
Model RE OLS RE OLS RE OLS
Period -0.152*** -0.175*** -0.046*** -0.023 -0.080*** -0.035
[0.010] [0.016] [0.014] [0.020] [0.019] [0.033]
ej;t 1 0.209*** 0.433*** 0.336*** 0.571*** 0.138*** 0.403***
[0.014] [0.023] [0.028] [0.034] [0.040] [0.083]
TimesPaidt 1 -0.577*** -0.568*** -0.742*** -0.422*
[0.099] [0.129] [0.138] [0.217]
ej;t 1X 0.055*** 0.063*** 0.083*** 0.046
TimesPaidt 1 [0.016] [0.019] [0.023] [0.033]
SELECT -0.267 -0.020
[0.336] [0.291]
PERFORM -0.519* -0.281
[0.285] [0.253]
Constant 5.483*** 4.536*** 4.231*** 2.722*** 6.878*** 4.425***
[0.110] [0.159] [0.197] [0.261] [0.464] [0.743]
Observations 2594 2594 2338 2338 1336 1336
Subjects 256 . 252 . 160 .
Wald-2 347.6 . 581.1 . 171.5 .
R-squared . 0.25 . 0.40 . 0.21
Random eﬀects and clustered standard errors are calculated on the level of experimental subjects.
Standard errors given in brackets. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance levels of p < 0:01, p < 0:05
and p < 0:1, respectively.
evaluated at the mean of ej;t 1  5:35 in run 1 and ej;t 1  5:85 in run 2. Hence,
these results suggest the insurance eﬀect of group lending becomes weaker over
time: While group responsibility oﬀers an insurance against involuntary default and
increases the probability of further credits, the willingness to exert eﬀort decreases
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after agents had to stand in for each other.21
The described results remain robust for joint liability borrowers in run 2 (model
3). Here, we include also the dummy variables PERFORM and SELECT for the re-
spective treatments. In line with non-parametric tests, the PERFORM dummy has
a negative sign and is (weakly) signiﬁcant in the random eﬀects speciﬁcation while
the SELECT dummy is not signiﬁcant in either case. The signs and signiﬁcance lev-
els of variables capturing the interaction within borrower pairs remain comparable
to run 1. The exception is the interaction term ej;t 1 X TimesPaidt 1 that is not
signiﬁcant in the OLS speciﬁcation of model 3.22
A ﬁnal aspect that could inﬂuence decisions in our setting is risk aversion. The
threat of not receiving further credit might induce higher eﬀort exertion among
the more risk-averse subjects regardless of the partner choices. Therefore, as a
further robustness check, we collected a survey measure for risk aversion in 5 of 8
experimental sessions. This measure is the answer to the question “Are you generally
willing to take risks, or do you try to avoid risks?" taken from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP).23 People could answer on a scale from 0 (risk averse) to
10 (fully prepared to take risks). We rerun regression models 2 and 3 including
the variable for risk preference. The results for individual decisions in run 1 and
2 are listed in table 5.6 in the Appendix. First, in all speciﬁcations the coeﬃcient
has the expected sign and is signiﬁcant in most cases: The more risk averse a
person is – displayed by lower values for the risk preference variable –, the higher
is her estimated eﬀort. Hence, the possibility of default and exclusion from further
credits has a disciplinary eﬀect among borrower pairs. However, the impacts of both
variables concerning partner interaction (ej;t 1 and TimesPaidt 1) remain valid if
risk aversion is included.24
21Conclusions are the same if we include repayments for the partner in the preceding round
instead of accumulated repayments.
22In all described OLS regression models, we calculate clustered standard errors on the level of
the experimental subjects. However, using clustered standard errors per matching group yields
identical signiﬁcance levels of the variables.
23For a description of the SOEP see Wagner et al. (2007).
24The only exception is the OLS speciﬁcation of model 5, in which the coeﬃcient of
TimesPaidt 1 is still negative but not signiﬁcant any more.
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5.5.3 Selection into Contracts
In the SELECTION treatment, 25 out of 64 subjects (39.1%) decided to choose the
individual contract. To distinguish between possible motivations for the contract
choice, we compare subjects opting for individual liability to those choosing joint
liability with respect to several measures calculated over run 1 (see table 5.5). Av-
erage variable values are compared on the level of experimental matching groups
using two-sided WMPSR tests.
Table 5.5
Averages Run 1 per Contract Choice
Contract Choice Individual Joint p-value
Liability Liability
Own Eﬀort 5.54 6.10 0.383
Partner Eﬀort 5.28 6.25 0.039
Partner paid (Share of Periods) 0.14 0.17 0.375
Paid for Partner (Share of Periods) 0.21 0.12 0.016
Risk Preference* 4.00 4.53 0.375
Signiﬁcant diﬀerences are indicated by bold numbers. Mean values are compared using two-sided
WPMSR tests.
*A measure for risk aversion was collected only for 32 out of 64 subjects in the SELECT treatment.
The ﬁrst variable we address is own average eﬀort. Although subjects choosing
individual liability exert lower eﬀort on average, the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant. In
contrast, average partner eﬀort seems to be more important for the contract choice:
Eﬀort exerted by partners of subjects choosing the individual contract is some 18%
lower than in case of joint liability subjects, and this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant (p =
:034, two-sided WMPSR test). Moreover, in line with individual eﬀort decisions, the
extent to which a subject had to stand in for the partner matters also for contract
selection: Persons choosing individual liability on average had to repay the partner’s
loan in 21% of all active periods compared to 12% of persons choosing joint liability
(the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant with p = :016, two-sided WMPSR test). Contrary, the
insurance eﬀect of joint liability lending does not seem to inﬂuence contract choices
strongly: Individual liability subjects on average relied less often on their partners
(14% of periods in contrast to 17%), but the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant. Finally,
subjects do not diﬀer with respect to risk preferences p = :375, two-sided WMPSR
test).
Summarizing, our results suggest that personal characteristics and behavior of the
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borrower are only of lower relevance for the selection into contract schemes. Instead,
experience with the partner seems to direct the choices: The lower a partner’s
average eﬀort and the higher the frequency of partner repayments, the more likely
is a person to prefer the individual credit contract.25
5.6 Conclusions
We have conducted a microﬁnance experiment in which subjects decide about eﬀort
invested into risky projects. In the ﬁrst run of the experiment, all participants re-
ceive group lending contracts, in which two randomly matched subjects are jointly
responsible for the repayment of the sum of both credits. While it is collectively
optimal to exert the highest possible eﬀort, it is individually rational to choose the
minimum eﬀort level. In the second run, participants are converted to individual
contracts on the basis of self-selection (treatment SELECT) and repayment perfor-
mance (treatment PERFORM). Both treatments are compared to a reference setting
in which subjects interact under joint liability for both runs (treatment BASE).
In all treatments and both runs, high average eﬀort levels are achieved. Thus,
group lending contracts work well to foster cooperation among borrowers. Due to the
high levels of cooperation under group lending, a conversion to individual contracts
does not not pay oﬀ from a lender’s perspective in our setting. However, whereas
the insurance eﬀect of group lending dominates the disciplining eﬀects of individual
liability, cooperation within borrower groups remains below the optimal level and
decreases over time.
One reason is that within-group moral hazard is still observable: in the second
run, individual liability subjects choose signiﬁcantly higher eﬀorts than in the ﬁrst
run. Moreover, eﬀort decisions under joint liability are highly path-dependent. The
decision of a borrower to exert eﬀort is strongly inﬂuenced by her partner’s eﬀort
level. Hence, this result is in line with the literature about conditional cooperation
in public goods games (see for example Fischbacher et al., 2001 and Fischbacher
and Gächter, forthcoming). Furthermore, also the realized outcomes matter for
eﬀort choices. The more often a subject had to repay the partner’s loan, the lower
25This interpretation is also conﬁrmed by expected eﬀort levels under joint liability in run 2
collected among half of the subjects in the post-experimental questionnaire. While persons choosing
joint liability expected an average eﬀort level of eJL;Run2  6:2, the value for persons opting for
individual liability was eJL;Run2  5:6.
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is her estimated eﬀort in subsequent periods. All in all, these results suggest the
importance of within-group dynamics for the functioning of joint liability lending.
A comparison of conversion mechanisms shows that removing the groups with a
high repayment performance may have a negative impact on the remaining borrow-
ers. The latter subjects tend to exert lower eﬀort than their counterparts in the
reference treatment. This suggests that the willingness to cooperate may decline
after the more successful borrowers leave the program and borrowers are rematched.
Contrary, self-selection of subjects into contracts does not systematically change
average eﬀort or repayment performance in run 2. In particular, there is no sign for
systematic selection of cooperative persons in and out of the joint liability scheme.
Instead, partner behavior and the frequency of double repayments are more impor-
tant drivers for selection into individual liability.
Our controlled laboratory experiment certainly captures only few of the aspects
that determine the success of microﬁnance programs in the ﬁeld. Yet the study gives
an indication that it might be necessary for microﬁnance institutions to investigate
within-group dynamics over time – given that in practice borrower groups typically
receive more than one loan.
Furthermore, our study provided a ﬁrst test of the eﬀects of alternative conversion
mechanisms on cooperation avoiding sample-selection problems emerging with ﬁeld
data. To connect ﬁeld research and laboratory experiments might be a promising
approach for further research in the microﬁnance context.
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5.7 Appendix
5.7.1 Instructions
Below we show the instructions for the ﬁrst and second run in treatment SELECT.
Instructions for the other groups and treatments were formulated in a similar way.
Instructions: General Information
Welcome to the experiment! In this experiment you can earn money. How much
depends on your decisions and the decisions of other participants.
From now on, please do not communicate with other participants. If you have a
question concerning the experiment, please raise your hand! We will come to you
and answer your question. If you violate these rules, we have to exclude you from
the experiment and all payoﬀs.
In the experiment ECU is used as the currency. At the end of the experiment, your
payoﬀ in ECU is converted into Euro and paid out in cash. The exchange rate is 30
ECU = 1 Euro. In the experiment, all ECU amounts are rounded to whole numbers.
The experiment consists of two runs. After the experiment, one of the two runs is
randomly selected. The sum of period payoﬀs in this run is paid out. In addition,
you receive an amount of 5.00 Euros for your participation in the experiment, which
is paid out at the end regardless of the decisions. If you make a loss in the course
of the experiment, this loss will be set oﬀ against the amount of 5.00 Euros.
Instructions: First Run
The following instructions refer to the ﬁrst run. After the ﬁrst run you will receive
new instructions.
The ﬁrst run consists of 12 periods. Previous to the ﬁrst run, pairs of two participants
are formed randomly. These pairs interact with each other during the whole ﬁrst
run. The identity of the participant you are interacting with is secret, and no
other participant will be informed about your identity. Thus, your decisions are
anonymous.
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The following explanations apply to you and the other participant. The other par-
ticipant faces exactly the same decision situation as you.
In the ﬁrst period of the experiment you and the other participant receive a credit
of 50 ECU each. The credit amounts automatically fund a risky investment project.
Each participant has a personal investment project into which her credit is invested.
Possible payoﬀs of the investment project are as follows:
 In case of success, each investment project achieves a payoﬀ of 200 ECU.
 In case of failure, each investment project achieves a payoﬀ of 0 ECU.
The payoﬀ of your investment project and the payoﬀ of the other participant’s
investment project are independent of each other.
Success probability of your project is inﬂuenced by your level of eﬀort. You can
choose every integer between A = 0 (lowest eﬀort) and A = 8 (highest eﬀort) as
eﬀort level (in the following abbreviated with A).
 If you choose A = 0, the success probability of your project is 50%.
 For every unit of eﬀort, the success probability of your project increases by
5%.
 Examples:
– If you choose A = 1, the success probability of your project is 55%.
– In case of A = 2, the success probability of your project is 60%.
– ...
– In case of the highest eﬀort level A = 8, the success probability of your
project is 90%.
For every unit of eﬀort that you choose, you have costs of 6 ECU. (Example: If you
choose A = 4, the costs of eﬀort are 4 6 ECU = 24 ECU.) The costs for your chosen
eﬀort level incur regardless of the project success.
You ﬁnd an overview of possible eﬀort levels and the associated costs in the following
table.
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Eﬀort level chosen 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Success probability
of the project in % 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90%
Eﬀort costs 0 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48
After you and the other participant have chosen eﬀort levels, payoﬀs of both invest-
ment projects are randomly determined. You are informed about:
 the payoﬀ of your project (either 200 ECU or 0 ECU).
 the payoﬀ of the other participant’s project (either 200 ECU or 0 ECU).
 your chosen eﬀort level and eﬀort costs.
 the other participant’s eﬀort level and her eﬀort costs.
 your period-payoﬀ and the sum of period payoﬀs in this run.
 the other participant’s period payoﬀ and the sum of her period payoﬀs in this
run.
The repayment amount for your credit is 100 ECU, the repayment amount for the
other participant’s credit is also 100 ECU. After payoﬀs of the investment projects
are determined, credits have to be repaid. You and the other participant are jointly
responsible for the sum of both repayment amounts (100 ECU + 100 ECU = 200
ECU). If your project was successful (your payoﬀ = 200 ECU), the repayment for
your credit (= 100 ECU) is deducted automatically from your payoﬀ. If at the same
time the other participant’s project was not successful (payoﬀ = 0 ECU), she is
not able to repay her credit. In that case the other participant’s repayment is also
deducted automatically from your payoﬀ.
If your project was not successful (your payoﬀ = 0 ECU), you are not able to repay
your credit. If at the same time the project of the other participant was successful
(payoﬀ = 200 ECU), your repayment is deducted automatically from the payoﬀ of
the other participant.
It is not possible to use payoﬀs from previous periods for credit repayments.
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Your payoﬀ in a period in which you have received a credit is determined as follows:
+ Payoﬀs of your project
– Credit repayment
– Eﬀort costs
= Period payoﬀ
If the sum of both repayment amounts (= 200 ECU) is repaid, you and the other
participant receive a new credit of 50 ECU in the next period and the decision
situation proceeds again as described.
If less than the sum of both repayments (= 200 ECU) is repaid in one period, the
ﬁrst run is over for you and the other participant. You and the other participant
will not receive a new credit for the rest of this run and will not make any decisions.
Instructions: Second Run
Welcome to the second run of the experiment! The second run of the experiment
consists of 12 periods. For this run, all participants are divided into two groups,
group 1 and group 2. Before the experiment starts, you can choose the group you
want to belong to. If you have chosen one group, your choice is valid for the entire
second run.
Participants choosing group 1 are responsible only for the repayment of their own
credit during the entire second run. Otherwise the decision situation is identical to
the decision situation in the ﬁrst run. If a participant of group 1 is not able to repay
her credit (= 100 ECU) in one period, the second run is over for this participant.
In that case, the participant will not receive a new credit for the rest of the run and
will not make any decisions.
Participants choosing group 2 are again – together with another participant – re-
sponsible for the sum of repayments of both credits in the second run. Analogous
to the ﬁrst run, pairs of two participants are formed randomly previous to run 2.
These pairs will interact with each other during the whole second run.
The decision situation is identical to the decision situation in the ﬁrst run of the
experiment. If a pair of participants repays less than the sum of both repayment
amounts (= 200 ECU) in one period, the second run is over for both participants.
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In that case, both participants will not receive a new credit for the rest of this run
and will not make any decisions.
With respect to the assignment of participants in group 2, it is guaranteed that
no participants interact with each other that were matched in the ﬁrst run of the
experiment. The exception is that two participants that were matched in the ﬁrst
run are the only participants in group 2. If an odd number of participants chooses
group 2, one participant is randomly selected and assigned to group 1.
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5.7.2 Parametrization
In the following, it will be shown that the experimental parameters fulﬁl the require-
ments described in section 5.3. We focus on the following conditions:
1. The provision of minimum eﬀort e = e0 is individually optimal in the one-
shot game under both contract schemes. A social dilemma exists within the
borrower group under joint liability: ei = ej = emax is collectively optimal.
2. In the repeated game, full eﬀort exertion is optimal under the individual con-
tract.
E[i(ei;t = emax)] > E[i(ei;t = e0)] 8t.
3. In the repeated joint liability game, minimum eﬀort by both players is the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, but full eﬀort exertion maximizes the sum
of joint payoﬀs.
E[i(ei;t = emaxjej;t = emax)] > E[i(ei;t = e0jej;t = e0)] 8t.
4. An insurance eﬀect of group lending exists as long as a suﬃcient level of
cooperation can be maintained.
E[i;JL(ei;t = emaxjej;t = emax)] > E[i;IL(ei;t = emax)] >
E[i;JL(ei;t = e0jej;t = e0) 8t.
Please note that in case of joint liability, we focus predominantly on symmetric
strategies of the players (e = ei = ej). Furthermore, we consider mainly time-
invariant strategies in the repeated game.
Ad 1.
Expected payoﬀs for borrower i under the individual contract is denoted byE[i(e)] =
[p0+p(ei)](R L) c(ei). Inserting the given parameters, we can compare expected
payoﬀs from emax = 8 and e0 = 0. Thus,
E[i(ei = 8)] = (0:5 + 0:4)  (200  100)  6  8 < 0:5  (200  100) = E[i(ei = 0)]:
As 42 < 50, it is not optimal to exert eﬀort in the one-shot game for the individual
lender.
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Under the joint liability contract, the expected payoﬀ for borrower i accounts for
E[i(ei; ej)] = [p0 + pi(ei)]  [p0 + pj(ej)]  (R  L)+
[p0 + pi(ei)]  [1  p0   pj(ej)]  (R  2L)  c(ei)
As R = 2L in our case, the second term of the equation disappears. We calculate
expected payoﬀs if both partners choose emax and compare it to the case when both
choose the minimum feasible level e0:
E[i(ei = emaxjej = emax)] 7 E[i(ei = e0jej = e0)]
Inserting the parameters yields 0:9  0:9  (200  100)  6  8 7 0:5  0:5  (200  100)
=) 33 > 25: Hence, full eﬀort exertion would be socially optimal, however, given
the partner chooses emax, it is optimal to switch to e0, as 0:5  0:9  (200  100)  0 =
45 > 33.
Finally, the sum of payoﬀs for the borrowers should not be maximal at an asym-
metric eﬀort combination e0 < e < emax. However, ﬁgure 5.4 shows that the sum
of payoﬀs for the borrowers is maximized with ei = ej = 8.
Ad 2.
In the repeated game, expected payoﬀs from a given strategy crucially depend on
the probability that further credit is granted in subsequent periods which is denoted
by q. The expected period proﬁt E[i(ei = e)] has to be weighted by q, which in
the individual contract is equal to the success probability of the investment project.
Hence, the probability that a borrower receives a credit in the t-th period is denoted
by q(e)t 1 = [p0 + p(ei)]t 1. Expected payoﬀs of a given strategy ei = e 8t in which
a constant eﬀort level is chosen in all periods account for
E[i(ei = e)] =
TX
t=1
qt 1  E[i;t(ei;t = e)]:
Comparing E[i(ei = emax)] and E[i(ei = e0)] yields
P12
t=1(0:9)
t 1  42 7P12
t=1(0:5)
t 1  50 =) 7:18  42 > 1:99  50 =) 301:6 > 99:5.
Under the minimum eﬀort, the probability deteriorates that the borrower receives
loans in latter periods. Hence, it becomes optimal to bear the cost of full eﬀort
exertion to receive follow-up loans with a higher probability.
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Ad 3.
It can be shown by backwards induction that the symmetric choice of ei = ej = e0
is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the repeated joint liability game. More-
over, parameters have to ensure that both borrowers would improve their payoﬀs by
switching to the maximum eﬀort level. The argumentation is similar to 2. However,
expected payoﬀs and the probability q of further credit change. Due to the mutual
dependency of borrowers, the group is able to repay if at least one member is suc-
cessful with her investment project. Assuming symmetric eﬀort levels e = ei = ej,
this occurs with probability q(e) = [p0 + p(e)]2 + 2  [p0 + p(e)]  [1  p0   p(e)]. As
in the individual liability case, the expected value of a strategy ei;t = e 8t for both
players is
E[i(ei = e)] =
TX
t=1
qt 1  E[i;t(ei;t = e)]:
If full eﬀort exertion maximizes the sum of joint payoﬀs, it has to be true for each
borrower that E[i(ei;t = emaxjej;t = emax)] > E[i(ei;t = e0jej;t = e0)] 8t. Inserting
the present parameters conﬁrms that this requirement is met as
P12
t=1(0:99)
t 1 33 7P12
t=1(0:75)
t 1  25 =) 11:36  33 > 3:87  25 =) 374:9 > 96:8.
Furthermore, expected payoﬀs under full eﬀort exertion are also higher than payoﬀs
of an alternating strategy in which players in turn choose ei;t = emax and ej;t = e0.
The expected probability of further credit under this strategy accounts for q(e) =
[p0+p(emax)][p0+p(e0)]+[p0+p(emax)][1 p0 p(e0)]+[1 p0 p(emax)][p0+(p(e0)].
Expected period payoﬀ for the borrower providing full eﬀort is E[i(ei = emaxjej =
e0)] =  3 whereas the expected period payoﬀ for the partner with minimum eﬀort is
E[i(ei = e0jej = emax)] = 45 (see above). This yields an average period payoﬀ of 21,
and the expected value per borrower over all periods accounts for
P12
t=1(0:95)
t 1 21,
which is lower than expected payoﬀs under mutual full eﬀort exertion.
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Ad 4.
Under full cooperation, expected payoﬀs in the repeated game should be higher than
under optimal behavior in individual liability. However, individual lending should
be advantageous from the borrower’s perspective only if low levels of cooperation
can be established. Thus,
E[i;JL(ei;t = emaxjej;t = emax)] > E[i;IL(ei;t = emax)] >
E[i;JL(ei;t = e0jej;t = e0) 8t:
The chosen parameters meet this condition (see 2. and 3.), because 11:36  33 >
7:18  42 > 3:87  25. This reﬂects the insurance eﬀect of joint liability lending:
If both partners provide e = emax, expected payoﬀs per period drop compared
to individual contracts, however, vulnerability against default also becomes lower.
Hence, the probability of further credits increases, and this eﬀect dominates in our
case.
There exists a threshold for eﬀort exertion under group responsibility below which
the choice of individual liability in treatment SELECT is optimal. As was shown
under 2., a subject under the individual contract can achieve expected payoﬀs of
7:18  42 = 301:6. A high value of cooperation would make it optimal to choose
joint liability.26 We calculate the threshold for the choice of the group contract
by comparing E[i;JL(ei;t = e0jej;t > e0)] for all feasible eﬀort levels. For the
given parameters, the joint liability contract becomes optimal only for eﬀort lev-
els ej;t  7. If the partner chooses ej;t = 7, expected payoﬀs are E[i;JL(ei;t = e0j
ej;t = 7)] =
P12
t=1(0:93)
t 1  42:5 = 8:31  42:5 = 353:2 > 301:6. However, a partner
eﬀort of ej;t = 6 makes individual liability optimal, as E[i;JL(ei;t = e0jej;t = 6)] =P12
t=1(0:90)
t 1  40 = 7:18  40 = 287:2 < 301:6. Furthermore, this threshold remains
identical for all possible positive eﬀort levels ei;t of borrower i.
26However, after the subject has entered the contract, the social dilemma within the borrower
group remains existent.
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5.7.3 Additional Figures
Figure 5.4
Expected Sum of Period Payoffs per Borrower Pair and Effort
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Expected payoﬀs are calculated with parameter values R = 200, L = 100, I = 50, p0 = 0:5,
p(e) = 0:05  e and c(e) = 6  e.
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5.7.4 Additional Results
Table 5.6
Determinants of Effort Decisions under Joint Liability –
Robustness Checks
No. 4a 4b 5a 5b
Dependent ei;t ei;t ei;t ei;t
Variable
Run 1 Run 1 Run 2 Run 2
Model RE OLS RE OLS
Period -0.038** -0.021 -0.096*** -0.047
[0.016] [0.023] [0.021] [0.033]
ej;t 1 0.373*** 0.547*** 0.156*** 0.412***
[0.036] [0.044] [0.050] [0.111]
TimesPaidt 1 -0.582*** -0.708*** -0.865*** -0.556
[0.141] [0.174] [0.201] [0.439]
ej;t 1 X TimesPaidt 1 0.057*** 0.084*** 0.114*** 0.07
[0.021] [0.023] [0.031] [0.060]
Risk Preference -0.095** -0.071* -0.145** -0.09
[0.037] [0.040] [0.069] [0.088]
SELECT -0.192 0.054
[0.392] [0.440]
PERFORM -0.139 -0.014
[0.310] [0.286]
Constant 4.635*** 3.362*** 7.735*** 5.006***
[0.318] [0.422] [0.629] [1.025]
Observations 1440 1440 968 968
Number of subjects 156 . 112 .
Wald-2 385 . 148.1 .
R-squared . 0.39 . 0.21
Random eﬀects and clustered standard errors are calculated on the level of experimental subjects.
Standard errors given in brackets. ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance levels of p < 0:01, p < 0:05
and p < 0:1, respectively.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
This thesis presents four studies that were designed to investigate the inﬂuence of
non-standard preferences on agency problems in various economic settings.
Chapter 2 analyzes the role of economic inequality for trust and trustworthiness
in the context of a dynamic growth game. In economies starting with equal en-
dowments (EQ), cooperation deteriorates over time, while trust remains stable in
economies starting with unequal endowments (IEQ). The reason is that during the
course of the game, subjects start to condition their trusting decisions on relative
wealth positions in EQ because wealth levels are interpreted as a signal for trust-
worthiness in previous rounds. Contrary, wealth levels in IEQ have no information
value and are subsequently only of minor importance for sender decisions.
Our results suggest that the relationship between inequality and growth through
the transmitter trust is not as linear and straightforward as suggested in the related
empirical literature. Speciﬁcally, our results provide evidence that the source, timing
and dynamics of inequality within a society may have explanatory power for its
behavioral impact on prosperity and growth. Thus, new studies are required to gain
insights into the interaction between changes of the income dispersion and their
eﬀects on the subsequent willingness of subjects to engage in economic transactions.
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the role of relative comparisons for the functioning
of wage schemes. In chapter 3, we use a combination of survey and compensa-
tion data from a multinational company. In line with loss aversion and inequality
aversion, we ﬁnd strong evidence for the importance of reference points with respect
to bonus payments for both job satisfaction and performance. Negative deviations
from a reference point – the managers’ bonus budgets – lower job satisfaction signi-
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ﬁcantly and decrease incentives for performance. Contrary, positive deviations from
the reference point have no signiﬁcant eﬀect.
An important question following from this observation is how transparent incen-
tive systems should be. The eﬀects of transparency can be ambiguous. On the one
hand, transparency may increase procedural fairness perceptions of compensation
schemes. Yet transparency can also mitigate incentives if it triggers relative social
comparisons and the formation of precise expectations which may eventually be
disappointed.
Moreover, in the case of the particular bonus system, a personal and a social
reference point coincide. Falling short of her bonus budget yields a personal loss
for the respective manager and also signals a low relative position among the other
managers in her department. In our data set, it is not possible to distinguish between
these two sources of discouragement. However, for the practical design of incentive
systems it would be important to know the relative importance of each of those
eﬀects for our results.
In chapter 4, the impact of wage diﬀerentials on working performance is
studied in a real-eﬀort experiment. In a treatment with piece-rate wages and pub-
lic wage information, we ﬁnd a detrimental inﬂuence of social comparisons on eﬀort
exertion that is mainly driven by low-paid subjects. This eﬀect is only existent if par-
ticipants receive information about peer wages. Moreover, while our study provides
further evidence that social comparisons matter for the incentive eﬀect of wages, it
also indicates that the form of compensation might be important: When wages are
ﬂat rather than piece-rate, performance eﬀects under public wage information are
largely mitigated.
The latter result would be consistent with the orientation on reference incomes
(see Köszegi and Rabin, 2006, for a formalization of this idea). If subjects focused on
a target income for the entire experiment rather than for the two separate tasks, the
decrease in ﬁxed wages would not be perceived as a loss and, subsequently, would not
aﬀect behavior. Therefore, for the choice between diﬀerent forms of compensation,
further research would be required to gain a better understanding about how wage
expectations and reference incomes emerge in working environments.
Chapter 5 reports the results of a microﬁnance experiment in which subjects
decide about eﬀort invested into risky projects and are jointly responsible for credit
repayment. Whereas high and relatively stable eﬀort levels are achieved, within-
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group moral hazard is still observable. Moreover, decisions are highly path-dependent
because individual eﬀort levels are related to partner eﬀorts and partner repayments
in previous rounds. A comparison of conversion schemes from group to individual
lending reveals that self-selection into contracts do not decrease average eﬀort in
joint liability groups whereas after conversion based on repayment success, eﬀort
levels of borrower groups tend to be lower than in a reference treatment. The lat-
ter result suggests that the willingness to cooperate may decrease after the more
successful borrowers leave the program and borrowers are rematched.
Our study points out that the dynamics of borrower behavior might inﬂuence
the success of group lending contracts. Due to inherent moral hazard problems,
it might become necessary for microﬁnance institutions to intensify monitoring of
borrower groups. Yet, while our experiment allows to investigate the incentive eﬀects
of group and individual lending in a controlled environment, it captures only few
of the aspects that determine the success of microﬁnance programs in the ﬁeld.
Thus, a connection of ﬁeld data and laboratory experiments might be a promising
approach for further research on the improvement of contracts and institutions in
the microﬁnance context.
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